Comment

Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy:
It's a Question of Priorities*
Conflicting case law exists regarding the proper treatment of
environmental claims in bankruptcy-primarily in the contexts of a
trustee s power to abandon contaminated property, a debtors
ability to receive a discharge of environmental liability, and a
creditors request for administrative priority.
This Comment
evaluates criteria courts have established for characterizing
environmental claims andfor determining their priority in bankruptcy. It examines the relationships between the trustees abandonment
power, the priority of environmental claims, and the determination
of when a claim arises. Criteria are suggested for characterizing
environmental claims and for determining their priority in bankruptcy which resolve the conflicting case law and result in a uniform
and consistent application of the Bankruptcy Code, environmental
law, and Supreme Court precedent.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, hazardous substances have become a great
national concern due to their severe impact on the environment and
public health and safety. Both Congress and state legislatures have
enacted comprehensive environmental laws to address existing and future
problems associated with hazardous waste. Under these laws, businesses
or individuals may find themselves liable for the substantial costs of
identification, removal, and disposal of hazardous waste. Faced with
such liability, a party may choose or be forced to seek protection from
the financial burden in bankruptcy.
The goal of the bankruptcy law is to rehabilitate the debtor by·
allowing the debtor to discharge prepetition debts, abandon property, and
make pro rata payoffs to creditors. 1 The goal of environmental law is
to protect the environment and preserve public health and safety by
imposing liability for hazardous waste cleanup. The goals of bankruptcy
and environmental law come into conflict when individuals or business-

1. There is serious disagreement among scholars regarding the policies behind
bankruptcy law and the source of the rights which are administered in bankruptcy. Some
scholars view loss distribution as the central policy concern of bankruptcy. They believe
that creditors' state-defined rights are redefined in bankruptcy through the process of
loss distribution. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 775 (1987).
Other scholars view bankruptcy as administration of the collection efforts of creditors
with state-defined rights. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 815 (1987).
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es, subject to environmental liability they are financially unable or
unwilling to satisfy, seek protection in bankruptcy. This conflict has
· been the subject of much discussion in recent years.
The fundamental issue in resolving this conflict is under what
circumstances and to what extent is a bankruptcy estate liable for an
environmental claim-for example, the cleanup costs of contaminated
estate property. Conflicting case law exists regarding this issue because
courts disagree on whether to prioritize environmental policy or
bankruptcy policy ahead of the other. Additionally, courts often fail to
give proper consideration to either the "priority" of environmental claims
outside of bankruptcy or the lack of "priority" of environmental claims
in bankruptcy.
Determining the proper treatment of environmental claims in
bankruptcy requires consideration of the priority of claims in three legal
contexts. First, the priority of environmental claims relative to other
claims outside of bankruptcy must be understood by looking at state law
and federal nonbankruptcy law. Second, the priority of environmental
claims relative to other claims in bankruptcy must be understood by
looking at the Bankruptcy Code.2 Third, the priority of environmental
objectives relative to bankruptcy objectives must be considered by
looking at the competing policies behind bankruptcy law and environmental law.
This Comment evaluates criteria courts have established for characterizing environmental claims and for determining their priority in
bankruptcy. Part II provides a brief summary of relevant environmental
and bankruptcy law. Part III analyzes criteria for determining when an
environmental claim arises and the consequences of that determination.
Part IV discusses the trustee's power to abandon property subject to
environmental liability and the consequences of abandonment. Part V
addresses the bankruptcy estate's liability for environmental claims and
the prioritization of those claims. Finally, part VI suggests criteria for
characterizing environmental claims and for determining their proper
priority in bankruptcy. These criteria resolve the conflicting case law
and result in a uniform and consistent application of the Bankruptcy
Code and Supreme Court precedent.

2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
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IL
A.

LEGISLATION

Environmental Law

An increasing amount of environmental legislation and litigation
evince the heightened importance of environmental responsibility in our
society. The handling and disposal of hazardous waste as well as the
remediation of contaminated property have become tremendous concerns.
Substantial numbers of properties contaminated with toxic substances
caused by improper hazardous waste handling and disposal procedures
threaten public health and safety.
Traditionally, environmental
legislation has served to prevent future environmental damage by
regulating the conduct of potential polluters. However, some more
recent environmental legislation serves to remedy preexisting environmental damage by authorizing the government to respond immediately
to hazards which threaten the public. Environmental liability can arise
in various forms, including an obligation to pay for environmental
cleanup expenses incurred by the government or others, an obligation to
perform a cleanup directly, or an obligation to refrain from polluting in
the future.
One of the most extensive environmental laws governing liability for
hazardous waste is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 3
Under
CERCLA, the President, who has delegated his power to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is authorized to dispose of hazardous
waste and to remediate contaminated property when there is an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. 4 After the EPA
has discovered a hazardous release, it assesses the site and determines
the degree of risk to human health and the environment. The EPA

3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675 (1988)).
4. CERCLA provides that:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public
health or welfare, the President is authorized to act . . . to remove . . . and
provide for remedial action . . . or take any other response measure . . .
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (1988).
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places those sites with a sufficiently high degree of risk on the National
Priorities List (NPL). 5
Congress has established a "Superfund" which provides a source of
immediate funding to the EPA for hazardous waste cleanup operations.
Under CERCLA, the EPA may undertake a cleanup, using funds from
the Superfund, and recoup its response costs by bringing an action
against potentially responsible parties (PRPs). 6 Liability for the EPA's
response costs is sorted out after the cleanup. Alternatively, the EPA
may order the present owner of contaminated property to take cleanup
action7 and thus bear the :financial burden. 8 Either way, liability of
PRPs is broad and can be substantial. The PRPs are held jointly and
severally liable for the hazardous waste cleanup and disposal costs. 9
CERCLA liability is imposed not only on those parties responsible for
hazardous waste releases but also on those parties currently in possession
of contaminated property. 1 CERCLA also has provisions permitting
private parties to bring civil actions against PRPs for the recovery of
their expenses in cleaning up contaminated property. 11
Other federal statutes impose liability for different types of environmental harm or impose liability on other parties. For example, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 12 imposes
liability for toxic waste cleanup not only on property owners, regardless
of fault, but also on all those involved, from the generation of the
hazardous waste through the disposal of it. Many state legislatures have
enacted similar types of environmental legislation.
Although environmental legislation is..in place that imposes liability on
responsible parties for cleanup and hazardous waste disposal, such

°

5. Id. § 9605(c).
6. Potentially responsible parties, those "covered persons" upon whom liability
is imposed by CERCLA, include: (1) the current owner or operator of the site, (2) the
owner or operator of the site at the time of the contamination, (3) the person who
arranged for the disposal of the waste, and (4) the person who transported the waste to
the site. Id. § 9607(a)(l)-(4).
7. Id. § 9606(a).
8. However, the owner may seek contribution from other PRPs. Id.§ 9613(f)(l).
9. United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
10. Id. § 9607(a)(l).
11. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in
1986 explicitly created a right of contribution. Any person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a). Id. § 9613(f).
12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)).
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legislation often fails to establish a priority for the liability imposed,
making enforcement difficult. A legislature may choose to create a
superpriority lien, a secured lien subordinate to all existing perfected
liens, or an unsecured interest in remediated property based on environmental liability. The power and authority to prioritize environmental
liability is in the hands of the legislatures, not federal bankruptcy courts.
Some environmental laws establish a priority by creating a lien on the
remediated property, junior to any existing and perfected security
interests, to secure the repayment of response costs incurred by the
government. 13 Unfortunately, when environmental liability exists on
an encumbered property, a junior lien often provides the government
with little, if any, protection at all. A few states have environmental
legislation that creates a superpriority lien on remediated property to
secure repayment of response costs. A superpriority lien receives
priority ahead of all other secured creditors. Superpriority liens are
uncommon and the consequences are somewhat unsatisfying because
they simply shift the burden of insuring against environmental liability
from the government to lenders.
Part of the reason for the substantial conflict in case law regarding the
treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is the failure of state
and federal law to establish a priority for environmental claims outside
of bankruptcy. Legislatures have the power to establish priorities by
creating liens on property to secure the payment of environmental
liabilities. Those priorities, established under state or federal law, are
respected in bankruptcy. However, when state or federal legislatures fail
to prioritize environmental claims above others, should a bankruptcy
court create such a priority? This Comment carefully considers this
issue and concludes that although important environmental policies may
support such a proposition, a bankruptcy court is not free to create rights
and priorities which do not exist under nonbankruptcy law. Such powers
must remain in the capable hands of the legistlatures.
B.

Bankruptcy Law

Bankruptcy provides debtors an opportunity to satisfy creditors by
liquidating assets or reorganizing their affairs under the protection of the
Bankruptcy Code. 14 Bankruptcy, by imposing a collective, compulsory

13. For example, CERCLA includes a provision giving the government a lien on
remediated property which arises when cleanup costs have been incurred, but the lien
is subject to existing perfected liens. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(/) (1988).
14. An individual liquidates under chapter 7 and reorganizes under chapter 13. 11
U.S.C. §§ 701-766, 1301-1330 (1988). A corporation usually liquidates under chapter
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proceeding, forces all of the creditors to act as one for the benefit of the
whole group. 15 One objective of bankruptcy is to assure equal and
identical treatment of all creditors with the same type of claim, thus
preventing any creditor from receiving preferential treatment. A second
objective is to provide the debtor with a fresh start by allowing the
debtor to discharge debts incurred before bankruptcy. 16
A debtor seeks relief by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. 17
When the debtor files, a bankruptcy "estate" is created which contains
all of the debtor's assets and liabilities. The fundamental purpose of a
chapter 7 bankruptcy is to liquidate the estate assets while maximizing
the size of the estate for the benefit of the creditors. Under chapter 7 a
trustee will take control of the debtor's assets and liabilities and liquidate
the estate to satisfy the demands of the creditors to the greatest extent
possible. The fundamental purpose of a chapter 11 bankruptcy is the
rehabilitation of the debtor's business. Chapter 11 is useful for
businesses which might be successfully rehabilitated rather than being
subjected to an economically wasteful liquidation. The debtor often
administers a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate, acting in the fiduciary role
of "debtor in possession," while continuing to operate the business
during the reorganization.
Creditors may assert "claims" against the bankruptcy estate for
liabilities incurred by the debtor before bankruptcy or by the trustee
during the bankruptcy. A "claim" is a "right to payment" or a "right to
an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise
to a right to payment." 18 A claim may.be contingent or actual and may

7, but may liquidate all or part of a business under chapter 11. A corporation
reorganizes under chapter 11. Id. §§ 701-766, 1101-1174.
15. Thomas H. Jackson, Who Pays? Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, STAN. LAW., Fall
1985, at 8, 10.
16. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266-67; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08; see also Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (recognizing the bankruptcy objective of providing a debtor with a "fresh start").
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a) (1988).
18. Id. § 101(5). This provision states:
'[C]laim' means (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
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be unliquidated, unmatured, or disputed. A "debt" is liability on a
claim. 19 A "creditor" is an entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose before the bankruptcy. 2 Claims are classified as either
prepetition or postpetition. Prepetition environmental claims arise from
liability incurred by the debtor before the filing of the bankruptcy.
Postpetition claims arise from liability incurred by the bankruptcy estate
after the bankruptcy was filed. The bankruptcy is intended to preserve
and distribute the debtor's assets to creditors who assert claims against
a debtor for liabilities incurred prepetition. The bankruptcy is also
intended to discharge the debtor's liability for those debts. 21
The distinction between prepetition and postpetition claims is very
important. In general, a debtor is discharged and no longer personally
liable for prepetition obligations unless the obligation is outside the
Code's definition of "claim" and "debt" or the obligation falls within an
exception to discharge under section 523(a). 22 Bankruptcy Code
section 72723 governs the discharge of a chapter 7 debtor while section
114l(d)24 governs the discharge of a chapter 11 debtor. Section 523
identifies claims which cannot be discharged by individual debtors.
Although a debtor's prepetition debts are discharged in bankruptcy, the
debtor is not discharged of liability incurred postpetition, even if the
debtor is operating under the protection of the Bankruptcy Code.
Claims asserted by creditors against a debtor typically arise under
nonbankruptcy law--usually state law. Nonbankruptcy law categorizes
creditors as either secured or unsecured. Bankruptcy law honors the

°

(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
Id.

19. Id. § 101(12).
20. Id. § 101(10).
21. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), ajf'd 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) ("IT]he Bankruptcy Code manifests
a strong and clearly expressed congressional intent that a debtor be discharged from all
claims, both actual and contingent, which arise out of pre-petition conduct.").
22. Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental
Framework, 44 FLA. L. REV. 153, 158 (1992).
23. The court shall grant an individual debtor a discharge, unless the debtor falls
into one of the exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Most exceptions
to discharge are based on the debtor's fraud or misconduct or the fact that the debtor has
previously been discharged. A discharge under section 727(a) discharges the debtor
from all debts that arose prepetition. Id. §§ 523(a), 727(a), (b).
24. The confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt that arose
before the confirmation. Id. § 114l(d)(l)(A). The confirmation of a plan does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted under section 523. Id. §
1141(d)(2).
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valid and perfected liens of secured creditors. A secured creditor
receives the proceeds from the sale of the collateral which secured the
debt. 25 In addition, the secured creditor may make a claim against the
debtor's bankruptcy estate for any de:ficiency. 26 Thus, the "priority" of
a creditor's lien on the debtor's property established under
nonbankruptcy law is respected in bankruptcy and is unaltered.
Creditors who have allowed, 27 unsecured claims may share in the
distribution of estate assets in a chapter 7 or 11 liquidation or participate
in the debtor's chapter 11 reorganization plan. The distribution of estate
assets to unsecured creditors is made according to a priority established
in the Bankruptcy Code. 28 Pursuant to the Code, administrative
expenses incurred during the bankruptcy receive first priority and are
paid in full, to the extent funds are available to do so.29 Priority
unsecured claims are paid next, and general unsecured claims are paid
last. 30 Typically, funds are insufficient to satisfy all claims, and
distribution is made on a pro rata basis in proportion to the amount of
claims relative to the total estate assets.
The bankruptcy court may authorize priority payment of administrative
expenses incurred by the bankruptcy estate postpetition. 31 Administrative expenses include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate. "32 A postpetition claim may or may not be
entitled to administrative expense priority. Not all postpetition claims
are administrative expenses. If a postpetition claim does not qualify as
an administrative expense, it is treated as a postpetition general
unsecured claim.

25. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a claim is secured to the extent of the
value of the creditor's interest in its collateral. Id. § 506(a). The Code also provides
that the trustee shall dispose of property in which a secured creditor (or any other entity
other than the estate) has an interest. Id. § 725.
26. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the secured creditor's allowed claim is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest in its collateral
is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Id. § 506(a).
27. The Bankruptcy Code requires creditors who seek payment in bankruptcy to
file a proof of claim or interest. Id. § 501. The Code also provides procedures for the
allowance of such claims or interests in bankruptcy. Id. § 502.
28. Id. § 507(a).
29. Id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(l).
30. Id. §§ 507(a)(2), 502(t).
31. Id. § 503.
32. Id. § 503(b)(l)(A).
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The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" and establishes the priority for
payment of various classes of claims. Although bankruptcy law
establishes the priority for payment of various classes of claims, it does
not determine the class into which a particular claim falls. That is
determined by nonbankruptcy law. For example, state law establishes
the priority of a lender's recorded deed of trust; that priority is respected
in bankruptcy.
III.

DISCHARGEABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN
BANKRUPTCY

The issue of the proper treatment of environmental claims in
bankruptcy arises in two common, yet opposing, contexts: (1) the
dischargeability of environmental claims and (2) the prioritization of
environmental claims for the purpose of sharing in the distribution of
estate assets. In either context, a court's analysis must begin with a
determination of whether the environmental liability constitutes a "claim"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, and if so, when the claim
arose-prepetition or postpetition. A distinction must be made between
the existence of a claim pursuant to section 101(5) and the
dischargeability of a claim pursuant to sections 727 and 1141(d)(l)(A).
The existence of a claim does not assure the dischargeability of that
claim. Few courts distinguish between the issue of when a claim arises
and when a claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy. This section identifies
difficulties in making these determinations and suggests criteria for doing
so that are consistent with both environmental and bankruptcy law
objectives.
Classification of an environmental claim as either prepetition or
postpetition can be complicated be~ause prepetition acts or occurrences
frequently have postpetition consequences. An environmental claim may
arise when the debtor first acts (for example, by placing hazardous waste
in a disposal site), when the hazardous waste is released, when the
release is discovered, or when the cost of hazardous waste cleanup is
incurred. This classification problem, however, is not unique to
environmental liability. Other forms of liability present equally difficult
classification problems. For example, tort claims are difficult to classify
because a tortious act may occur prepetition but the consequences may
not develop for many years or may only be discovered postpetition.
The characterization of a claim as prepetition or postpetition is
significant because it affects the determinations of whether the claim is
dischargeable, and if it is not, whether the claim should be treated as a
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general unsecured claim or a claim entitled to administrative priority. 33
If a creditor has a prepetition environmental claim, it is subject to
discharge and the creditor is one of many unsecured creditors paid on a
pro rata basis after payment of administrative expenses and higher
priority unsecured claims. If a creditor has a postpetition environmental
claim, it may qualify as an administrative expense.
The question of whether an environmental "claim" is dischargeable
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs. 34 The Court
held that prepetition environmental claims which could be properly
characterized as demands for money were dischargeable. 35 However,
the decision did not alter the duty of the debtor to obey an injunction
which prohibited the debtor from creating any further pollution. 36 The
injunction was not dischargeable. The Kovacs case raised the fundamental questions: (1) what type of environmental liability will be considered
a "claim" for purposes of discharge in bankruptcy and (2) when does an
environmental claim arise. Several tests have been developed by the
courts to determine when an environmental claim arises and whether it
is dischargeable.

A.

The Legal Relationship Test

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit37 and a few other

33. See supra part H.B.
34. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
35. Id. at 275, 281.
36. Id. at 284-85.
37. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
hazardous waste cleanup costs arising from debtor's prepetition activities could be
asserted against the reorganized debtor because no legal relationship existed to establish
a prepetition contingent CERCLA claim and that a CERCLA claim could
not arise before CERCLA was created), cert. denied, Penn Cent. Corp. v. United States,
503 U.S. 906 (1992); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.)
(explaining that tort "claims" did not arise until plaintiffs suffered identifiable and
compensable injuries from exposure to asbestos, at which time a legal relationship arose
simultaneously with the plaintiffs' cause of action), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985);
Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.
1984) (deciding that when debtor's accountant sought indemnification from the debtor
after several banks brought suit against the accountant postpetition, a "claim" did not
arise until the accountant filed an answer in the underlying lawsuit), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1160 (1985).
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courts38 have considered the legal relationship between parties in
making the determination of when a claim arises. A legal relationship
must exist between the creditor and debtor which gives rise to the claim.
Strictly construed, the legal relationship test requires that a claimant have
an existing cause of action in order to establish a claim in bankruptcy.
For example, applying this criterion to a tort, a negligent act does not
give rise to a claim until the tort victim suffers identifiable, compensable
injury, as required for a cause of action to accrue under state law. 39
Courts, in applying this criterion to environmental liability, have refused
to recognize a contingent prepetition CERCLA claim when the
government has not incurred any response costs prepetition because the
government has no cause of action against the debtor under CERCLA
until it incurs response costs.4 CERCLA does not give rise to a
cognizable legal claim until funds have been expended or remedial
measures have been taken to address environmental hazards. To foster
rapid cleanups, Congress has adopted a policy of delaying litigation to
determine environmental liability until after the investigation and
cleanup.
One problem with the legal relationship test is that it fails to
differentiate between a claim in bankruptcy and a cause of action under
nonbankruptcy law. Although nonbankruptcy law governs the existence
of a claim in bankruptcy, it is not dispositive of when a claim arises. 41
Under the current Bankruptcy Code, the definition of "claim" includes
contingent, unliquidated, and unmatured claims.42 Under the former
Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,43 creditors could only assert

°

38. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l,
Inc.), 126 B.R. 919 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that a "claim" arises when a cause
of action is established under CERCLA; which occurs only after the claimant has
incurred some response costs); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831
(D. Minn. 1990) (arguing that nonbankruptcy substantive law defines when a particular
relationship between a debtor and a third party amounts to a legal obligation giving rise
to a bankruptcy "claim" and that under CERCLA the government must incur response
costs to establish a legal obligation); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that future unknown claimants who have been exposed
to asbestos but have not yet manifested injuries do not have bankruptcy "claims").
39. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 864 (1985); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986). But see In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes may include liability to tort victims exposed to
asbestos who have not yet manifested asbestos-related injuries and therefore have not
accrued a cause of action under state law).
40. Allegheny, 126 B.R. at 925; Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835.
41. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
42. See supra note 18.
43. The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
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"provable" claims. Parties holding contingent or unliquidated claims
were excluded from the distribution of estate assets. As a result, the
debtor's fresh start was impaired because such claims were not
discharged and creditors were able to pursue the debtor after bankruptcy.
Congress has abolished the provability requirement. The current Code
includes procedures for courts to estimate .contingent or unliquidated
claims44 so that the claims may be paid and the debtor discharged.
However, the legal relationship test excludes contingent and unmatured
claims from bankruptcy. Consequently, adhering to the legal relationship test adds the concept of provability into the meaning of "claim,"
which the drafters of the Code specifically intended to abolish. 45 Thus,
the legal relationship test is in direct conflict with the existing Code as
well as with congressional intent. 46
A second problem with the legal relationship test is that it precludes
creditors with contingent or unmatured claims from sharing in the
distribution of estate assets in a chapter 7 liquidation. If unincurred
response costs for cleanup of prepetition releases are not valid contingent
claims, then environmental agencies will be uncompensated by a
corporation in a chapter 7 liquidation.47 In addition, preventing a claim
from arising until a cause of action accrues inhibits the debtor's ability
to discharge prepetition liability and start anew. 48
·
A related problem with the legal relationship test is that a debtor may
be precluded from effectuating a reorganization under chapter 11.
Although unincurred response costs may not constitute a claim, that
contingent liability may be substantial_ nonetheless and may impair the

44. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988). The legislative history explains that "contingent
or unmatured claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy court in order to afford the
debtor complete
bankruptcy relief." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848.
45. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
46. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code's legislative history states that "[a]11 claims against
the debtor, whether or not contingent or unliquidated, will be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case . . . . The proposed law will permit a complete settlement of the affairs
of a bankrupt debtor, and a complete discharge and fresh start." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6141.
47. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concuning);
United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir.
1991).
48. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
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debtor's prospects of achieving a viable reorganization. Unable to
reorganize, some corporations may be forced to liquidate in bankruptcy
or dissolve under state law. As a result, the debtor's assets will be
unavailable for environmental cleanup because the liability is not yet a
claim entitled to pro rata payment. 49
A third problem with the legal relationship test is that creditors may
manipulate the timing of their claims to obtain the most desirable
treatment of their claim. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a creditor will not
delay because only creditors with prepetition claims will share in the
distribution of estate assets. In a chapter 11 reorganization, however, a
creditor may choose to delay in order to obtain a postpetition claim
which is not discharged in the bankruptcy and which may be pursued
against the reorganized company. Allowing creditors to manipulate the
classification of their environmental claims by delaying cleanup or
investigation is in contravention of congressional intent in enacting
CERCLA, which was to allow the government to remedy environmental
hazards speedily.
Many courts and commentators have criticized the legal relationship
reasoning. 50 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,5 1 retreating
from a strict interpretation of the "legal relationship" test, recognized
that "a party may have a bankruptcy claim and not possess a cause of
action on that claim."52 However, the court maintained that any
interest cognizable under the Code must stem from "a legal relationship
relevant to the purported interest from which that interest may flow." 53

49. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002, 1005.
50. E.g., Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp.
Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 348 n.4 (2d. Cir. 1985); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R.
397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that it is immaterial in bankruptcy whether a claim
is ripe for adjudication under nonbankruptcy law as long as all the elements that give
rise to liability under nonbankruptcy law have occurred); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg
(In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding that the bankruptcy
definition of "claim" is not inextricably linked to the accrual of a cause of action under
state law); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(concluding that a prepetition claim may encompass a cause of action that is not
cognizable under nonbankruptcy law until after the bankruptcy has commenced). Contra
Philippe J. Kahn, Comment, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental Protection: Discharging
Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter Il, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2054 (1993)
(recommending that a CERCLA "claim" arises at the time the CERCLA cause of action
fully accrues and that the CERCLA "claim" be handled through settlement provisions
in CERCLA rather than through a bankruptcy reorganization).
51. Kilbarr Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. (In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 832.
53. Id.

234

Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy

[VOL. 32: 221, 1995]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

B.

The Debtors Conduct Test

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit54 and other courts55
have considered the debtor's conduct in making the determination of
when a claim arises. Under the debtor's conduct test, the determination
of when a claim arises is based on the timing of the debtor's actions that
gave rise to the claim. The debtor's conduct, rather than the legal
relationship between parties, can transform a nondischargeable
postpetition claim under the legal relationship test into a dischargeable
prepetition claim under the debtor's conduct test.
In the case of In re Chateaugay Corp., 56 the EPA sought their postconfirmation costs for cleanup of the debtor's prepetition releases of
hazardous waste to be considered outside the Code's definition of
"claim" so that the claim would not be discharged in the chapter 11
bankruptcy and the EPA could pursue the reorganized company. The
court affirmed the district court's decision that "an obligation to
reimburse [the] EPA for response costs is a dischargeable claim
whenever based upon a pre-petition release or threatened release of
hazardous substances . . . even though [prepetition releases] have not
then been discovered by [the] EPA (or anyone else)."57 The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that "before a contingent
claim can be discharged, it must result from pre-petition conduct
[resulting in a release or threatened release] fairly giving rise to that

54. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1991).
55. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.) (holding that a claim
arises when a tortious act or breach of warranty occurs prepetition), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg
(In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (explaining that the
triggering act which constitutes the basis for the cause of action must have occurred
prepetition); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(stating that in determining when a claim arises the focus should be on the timing of the
debtor's acts which give rise to the
claim); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690,
699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (recognizing an unmatured and contingent claim even
though the injury was undiscovered by the victim because a relationship existed between
tortfeasor and victim based on contact at the time of the tortious act and the consequential potential tort liability).
56. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 1000.
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contingent claim."58 The court explained that the "relationship between
environmental regulating agencies and those subject to regulation
provides sufficient 'contemplation' of contingencies to bring most
ultimately maturing payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct
within the definition of 'claims."'59 The court characterized the EPA's
claim as contingent rather than determining it to be outside the Code's
definition of claim.
All prepetition environmental liability was
discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy.
Many courts and commentators agree that a "relationship" must exist
between a creditor and a debtor in order to lay a foundation for a claim
in bankruptcy. 60 The Chateaugay decision has been criticized because
it broadens the concept of relationship to a point which undermines the
rationale for considering whether a relationship exists, namely that a
creditor with a relationship may anticipate its potential claim.61 One
commentator has argued: "Despite Congress's repeal of the 'provability'
requirement and its broad definition of 'claim,' nothing in the legislative
history or the Code suggests that Congress intended to discharge a
creditor's rights before the creditor knew or should have known that its
rights existed."62
The creditor's knowledge of the potential claim is an important factor
to consider in applying the debtor's conduct test. Some courts
considering the debtor's conduct test are presented with the issue of
whether a creditor is precluded from pursuing a claim against a debtor
because the debtor is protected by the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code. 63 In these cases, the creditor is well aware of its
rights against the debtor and is seeking redress. However, other courts,
presented with the issue of the dischargeability of contingent claims,
encounter difficult issues regarding to what ·extent, if any, a creditor
must have knowledge or notice of ,contingent liability for the debtor to
be discharged from that liability. 64 In Chateaugay, the court discharged

58. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added), ajf'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
59. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
60. E.g., Pettibone Corp. v. Ramirez (In re Pettibone Corp.), 90 B.R. 918, 931-33
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986).
61. E.g., Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy:
When Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 327, 353 (1991).
62. Id. at 349.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
64. Shawn F. Sullivan, Note, Discharge of CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: The
Necessity for a Uniform Position, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (1993) (discussing the
due process requirements associated with discharging CERCLA claims in a chapter 11
reorganization). See infra part III.D for a discussion of dischargeability.
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the debtor because the debtor and creditor were well aware of each
other. The debtor was aware of its contingent environmental liability
and scheduled the government agency as a creditor; the creditor received
notice of the bankruptcy and filed a proof of claim. The creditor had an
opportunity to anticipate its potential claims based on its prepetition
regulatory relationship with the debtor. 65

C.

The Fair Contemplation Test

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit66 and other courts67 have
considered whether liability resulting from the debtor's conduct was or
could have been fairly contemplated by the parties in determining
whether a claim is dischargeable. If liability was, or should have been,
fairly contemplated by the parties prepetition, it gives rise to a
prepetition claim which may be discharged in bankruptcy. These courts
combine the separate issues of when a claim arises and whether the
claim may be discharged into a single inquiry.
In In re Jensen, the Ninth Circuit held that where the state had
sufficient knowledge of the debtors' potential liability for cleanup costs
before the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, the state's contingent
claim was discharged. 68 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Paci.fie Railroad Co., 69
although not expressly adopting the fair contemplation test, explained:
[W]hen a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known
release of a hazardous substance which this potential claimant knows will lead

65'. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d
Cir. 1991).
66. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925 (9th
Cir. 1993).
67. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a prepetition claim existed where the claimant knew there had been a
release, response costs were imminent, and liability was tied to the debtor); Am Int'l,
Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (although not adopting the fair
contemplation test per se, following the magistrate judge's recommended holding that
a contingent claim arises when a release occurs and is dischargeable if it was within the
fair contemplation of the parties at the time of the bankruptcy filing); In re National
Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that the debtor's liability or
response costs associated with prepetition activity gave rise to a dischargeable claim to
the extent that such claims could fairly be contemplated by the parties at the time of
commencement of the case).
68. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 931.
69. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992)
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to CERCLA response costs, and when this potential claimant has, in fact,
conducted tests with regard to this contamination problem, then this potential
claimant has, at least, a contingent CERCLA claim .... 70
·

In that case the prepetition claim was discharged and the claimant was
not allowed to pursue the reorganized debtor.
The In re National Gypsum Co. 71 court identified factors relevant to
the inquiry of fair contemplation by the parties. These factors are
"knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable, [a
National Priorities List] listing, notification by [the] EPA of PRP
liability, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and
incurrence of response costs."72 That court considered the debtor's
conduct test applied in Chateaugay so broad a definition of claim as to
encompass costs that could not fairly have been contemplated by the
EPA or the debtor prepetition. 73 Those claims not fairly contemplated
by the parties should not be discharged.
The fair contemplation test is inconsistent with the language of both
the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. A claim is based on a right to
payment. In order to establish a claim, there is no requirement in the
Code that the parties have fairly contemplated liability at the time of the
bankruptcy. Although Congress has not defined "contingent" in the
Code, some courts and commentators have found that a contingent claim
for bankruptcy purposes ·exists when the liability-triggering event is
"reasonably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the
event giving rise to the claim occurred."74 However, the dictionary
definition of "contingent liability" is a liability which "is not now fixed
and absolute, but which will become so in
case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event."75 Using
this definition, fair contemplation, or foreseeability, is not necessary to
establish a contingent claim. A contingent claim arises under CERCLA
if the acts giving rise to a need for environmental cleanup occur
prepetition. Under these circumstances, the government has a prepetition
right to relief which carries with it an alternative right to payment, even
though it is contingent on the government expending money. Neither
70. Id. at 786.
71. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
72. Id. at 408.
73. Id.
74. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980),
ajf'd sub nom. All Media Properties, Inc. v. Best (In re All Media Properties, Inc.), 646
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991); Saville, supra note 61, at 362 (arguing that if
environmental liability is "foreseeable," it should be discharged; if it is not, it should
remain with the debtor).
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (6th ed. 1990),
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the timing nor the foreseeability of the government's cleanup expenditures should be a factor in determining whether there is a claim.
Nothing in either CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code supports such a
proposition. 76
CERCLA imposes liability on property owners when there is a release
of a hazardous substance on their property-whether or not the owner
is at fault or is even aware of the release. The debtor's liability for
repayment of the EPA's remediation costs does not depend on whether
or not the EPA or the property owner fairly contemplated, at any time,
that the EPA would need to take action to remediate the property in the
future. A contingent claim arises in bankruptcy when contingent liability
arises under nonbankruptcy law. Contingent liability under CERCLA
arises when the debtor's conduct results in the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance. At that time the property owner's
liability is contingent only upon the EPA taking steps to remedy the
environmental hazard. The debtor need not take any further action for
a cause of action to accrue under CERCLA in the future.
Although foreseeability is not a factor in establishing a contingent
claim in bankruptcy, one must consider separately the issue of whether
foreseeability is a factor in the dischargeability of a contingent claim in
bankruptcy. No provision in the Code explicitly requires that a
prepetition liability be "fairly contemplated" by the parties in order to be
discharged. No explicit exception to discharge exists in the Bankruptcy
Code for prepetition contingent environmental claims. Unless prepetition
environmental claims fall within an e,:cception to discharge, they should
be discharged.
- Only. one exception to discharge, section 523(a)(3)(A),77 may be
applicable. If an individual debtor fails to list or schedule a claim in
time for the creditor to :file a proof of claim, the creditor's claim will not
be discharged unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
case in time to file a claim. This exception assures that creditors will
have an opportunity to share in the distribution of the estate assets. If
the debt is neither listed nor scheduled and the creditor has no notice,
Heidt, supra note 22, at 179.
"A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- . . .
(3) neither listed nor scheduled ... in
time to permit - (A) ... timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing ...." 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(3)(A) (1988).
76.
77.
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the creditor cannot file a claim and share in the distribution of estate
assets.
In general, if notice and participation cannot be provided to· a creditor
holding an unknown future claim, that creditor's due process rights may
limit the court's ability to discharge a debtor's prepetition claims. 78
One court has required that the claimant have had notice of the debtor's
potential liability in time to file a proof of claim in order for the
environmental claim to be discharged. 79 The Seventh Circuit recognized this problem in In re UNR Industries, Inc. 80 The court stated that
"[t]he practical difficulties of identifying, giving constitutionally
adequate notice to, and attempting to estimate the damages of [unknown
future claimants] are formidable, and possibly insurmountable."81
However, this potential limitation on the dischargeability of prepetition
contingent claims is not based on the concept of "claim" or of
"dischargeability," but instead on the claimant's due process rights.
Even if a claimant is given notice, the notice may not be constitutionally sufficient if it does not provide sufficient details regarding the
claim. 82 On the other hand, due process may require no more than the
best possible notice under the circumstances. 83 One problem with the
fair contemplation test, which requires that contingent liability be fairly
contemplated by the parties, is that it is more stringent than the
requirements imposed by due process. Providing a creditor with proper
notice may satisfy due process requirements, but such notice cannot
substitute for the parties' fair contemplation of contingent liability
prepetition. Bankruptcy, environmental, and constitutional laws do not
justify imposing the stricter requirement of the fair contemplation test.
Another problem with the fair contemplation test, like the legal
relationship test, is that it encourages "dilatory tactics" on the part of the
creditor. The incentive is for the ci:editor to strategize on when to act
in order to avoid dischargeability of environmental claims in bankruptcy.
If the creditor acts after the bankruptcy is filed rather than before, the
claim may not be considered "in the fair contemplation" of the parties.

78. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690,692 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). See
generally Sullivan, supra note 64; Kahn, supra note 50, at 2034.
79. Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D. Minn.
1991) (holding that "[w]hen the debtor has not disclosed its- potential CERCLA ...
liabilities in long-since closed bankruptcy proceedings, and the governmental agency has
not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in sufficient time to file a claim in those
proceedings, the potential CERCLA . . . liability is not discharged").
80. 725 F.2d 1111, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. Id.
82. Saville, supra note 61, at 350.
83. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 692 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986)
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
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Similarly, the debtor may simply notify the creditor of potential liability
prior to filing bankruptcy in order to assure the creditor's prepetition
"fair contemplation." This is inapposite to the congressional intent of
CERCLA to facilitate immediate cleanup because it will unduly burden
the government with unnecessary investigations which will delay
environmental cleanups of the most seriously contaminated properties.

D.

Picking. the "Right" Test: When a Claim Arises and When a
Claim is Discharged
·

The Bankruptcy Code has no separate provision defining an "environmental claim."
The intent of section 101(5) is that "claim" be
interpreted broadly, encompassing contingent, unmatured, unliquidated
and disputed claims based on state or federal nonbankruptcy law
resulting from the debtor's prepetition conduct. 84 When Congress
enacted this revision of the Bankruptcy Code, it broadened the definition
of "claim" to encompass all types of liability incurred by the debtor
within the bankruptcy case. Therefore, an "environmental claim" should
fall within the general definition of "claim" provided in section 101(5)
of the Code85 and should not be treated separately or specially.
The Bankruptcy Code does not specify when a claim arises and courts
have struggled with this determination. The legal relationship test
cannot be supported because it excludes contingent and unmatured
claims from bankruptcy, in direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and
congressional intent, and encourages creditors to exercise dilatory tactics
to achieve preferential treatment of their claims. The fact that cleanup
takes place after the date of relief should have no effect on the
classification of the claim to recover cleanup expenses. Similarly, the
fair contemplation test cannot be supported. The fair contemplation test
can be viewed either as narrowing the definition of "claim" to include
only environmental liability fairly contemplated by the parties or as
excepting from discharge any environmental claim not fairly contemplated by the parties. Either view is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code
and environmental law.
84. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended a broad definition of
"claim." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08.
85. 11 u.s.c. § 101(5) (1988).
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The debtor's conduct test is consistent with both bankruptcy and
environmental law. A claim arises when prepetition conduct by the
debtor results in the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment. 86 Under CERCLA, contingent liability
exists when a hazardous environmental condition exists, regardless of
fault, knowledge, or fair contemplation of such liability, until the
government takes some form of cleanup action. 87 The bankruptcy court
should not exclude contingent .claims because they are not fairly
contemplated by the parties when this contingent liability exists outside
of bankruptcy.
The National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), an organization devoted
to defining what reforms should be made to the Bankruptcy Code, has
proposed a rule that considers the debtor's conduct in determining when
an environmental claim arises. 88 According to the NBC, environmental
claims should be treated just as any other claim. A prepetition
environmental claim, like any other prepetition claim, should be
discharged unless it falls within an exception to discharge provided in
the Code.
The conflict between environmental policies and bankruptcy policies
is particularly clear when considering the discharge of a debtor's
environmental liability.
Although no exception to discharge of
environmental liability exists in the Code, expeditious and effective
cleanup of hazardous substances is an important environmental objective
which may justify the creation of a new exception. Congress bears the
burden of weighing competing policies and establishing this exception
to discharge through legislation. If an exception to discharge is
desirable based on environmental policies, Congress should modify the
Bankruptcy Code to incorporate such an exception. Bankruptcy courts
confronted with environmental claims should not modify existing
priorities, established both inside and outside of bankruptcy law, by
redefining the meaning of "claim" and by creating nonstatutory
exceptions to discharge, in order to satisfy environmental objectives.

86. See id.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1988).
88. "A claim against a debtor for environmental harm should be regarded as
arising (A) When the debtor first (1) acts, resulting in, (2) fails to act, resulting in, or
(3) otherwise becomes legally responsible for the harm, (B) irrespective of when the
harm (1) occurs, (2) is manifested, (3) is fully known or knowable, or (4) is remediated."
ALI-ABA Conference, Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1993, A Presentation of the NBC's
Bankruptcy Code Review Project, June 10-12, 1993 at Atlanta, GA, at 4-5 [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Reform].
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IV. ABANDONMENT
The treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is controversial
because of the competing policies of environmental and bankruptcy law.
When a party responsible for environmental damage seeks relief in
bankruptcy, the question is who must bear the cost of environmental
remediation. If the environmental liability gives rise to a prepetition
claim, the government will bear the burden of a majority of the cleanup
costs because the bankruptcy estate will only pay the EPA on a pro rata
basis with other unsecured creditors. However, if the environmental
claim arose postpetition and qualifies as an administrative expense, the
bankruptcy estate will bear the burden of paying the cleanup costs to the
extent funds are available because the claim will be paid from estate
assets, in full, ahead of unsecured creditors.
In determining whether an environmental claim should be entitled to
administrative priority, some courts consider the trustee's power to
abandon89 the property relevant. The abandonment of property subject
to environmental liability is interpreted as a question of environmental
claim priority cast in a slightly different form. These courts hold that
a bankruptcy court cannot authorize a trustee to abandon property
without requiring the trustee to first clean up the property or reimburse
others for the cleanup costs. 90 The result of denying abandonment is
the prioritization of the environmental claim ahead of all other unsecured
claims because the funds used to satisfy the environmental claim would
otherwise be available to pay unsecured creditors. Thus, the decisions
of these courts regarding abandonment of property are in fact decisions
establishing environmental claim priority.91
These courts do not adequately distinguish between the issues of
abandonment and environmental claim priority.
Abandonment and
environmental claim priority are distinct issues. The abandonment issue
requires a determination of the conditions under which a trustee may
avoid the future liability associated with continued ownership or

89. The Bankruptcy Code provides: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
90. See part V.A for a discussion of the role of abandonment in determining
administrative priority and an analysis of the conflicting case law.
91. Jackson, supra note 15, at 12.
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operation of property in the bankruptcy estate. The claim priority issue
requires a determination of whether a creditor's environmental claim is
secured or unsecured, prepetition or postpetition, and necessary to
preserve the estate. Based on these factors, the bankruptcy court decides
the portion of estate assets to which the creditor is entitled. Treatment
of environmental claims is discussed in part V.
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee to abandon
property that is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value and benefit"
to the bankruptcy estate. 92 By abandoning burdensome property, the
trustee may expend estate resources in liquidating only those assets
which have a net value to the estate. Abandonment benefits the estate
by freeing the estate from obligations that have not yet arisen but might
arise if the trustee remains the property owner during bankruptcy. 93 A
trustee who abandons burdensome property prevents the bankruptcy
estate from incurring postpetition liability associated with ownership of
the property.
Courts disagree on the conditions under which a trustee may abandon
property subject to environmental liability. 94 Part of the reason for
disagreement is due to the misperception that When a trustee abandons
burdensome property, the trustee also abandons the debtor's liability for
environmental cleanup of the property. The trustee may abandon the
property, but not the debtor's prepetition liability incurred as a consequence of owning the property prepetition. The trustee's decision to
keep or abandon burdensome property does not affect that liability and
abandonment does not relieve the trustee from responsibility for the
debtor's prepetition liabilities.

A.

The Midlantic Decision

Although the trustee's abandonment power is unconditional as defined
in section 554 of the Code, the Supreme Court has restricted that power
when the property in question is subject to environmental liability. In
the landmark case of Mid/antic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, 95 . the Supreme Court considered a
trustee's power to abandon property containing toxic waste. In that case,
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste oil at two

92. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a), (b) (1988).
93. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1987, at 173.
94. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
95. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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facilities located in New York and New Jersey. 96 Investigations
revealed that Quanta accepted more than 470,000 gallons of oil
contaminated with PCB, a toxic carcinogen, at the two sites. 97 Quanta
filed a chapter 11 petition for reorganization during negotiations for
cleanup of the New Jersey site and converted to chapter 7 liquidation
after receiving a cleanup order. 98
The.bankruptcy court approved the trustee's abandonment of the New
York facility and the contaminated oil at the New Jersey site. 99 The
trustee removed the guard service and shut down the fire-suppression
system. The bankruptcy court did not require the trustee to take steps
to reduce imminent danger although 470,000 gallons of highly toxic
waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers presented risks of
explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through personal
contact. 100 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
bankruptcy court's decisions. 101
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decisions and
refused to allow the trustee to abandon the contaminated properties. The
Supreme Court found the trustee's abandonment "aggravated already
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry,
vandalism, and fire." 102 Although section 554(a) allows a trustee to
abandon property which is burdensome or of inconsequential value, the
Supreme Court created a narrow exception and refused to allow
abandonment. The Supreme Court concluded:
Congress did not intend for§ 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws. The
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment
without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health
and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question whether certain state
laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere
with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, [the Court] hold[s] that a trustee may
not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is

96. Id. at 494.
97. Id. at 496-97.
98. Id. at 497.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 499 n.3.
101. City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),
739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir.
1984).
102. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 499 n.3.
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reasonab1¥ designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards. 1

The Court further stated:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is a
narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future
violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment
power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to
protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm. 104

The Court has carved out a narrow exception to abandonment with the
Mid/antic decision. However, several problems cloud the Mid/antic
decision, making it difficult for trial courts to interpret and apply. 105
One commentator explains:
First, [Mid/antic] was endorsed by only a bare majority of justices. 106
Second, the Court expressly declined to attach a priority to claims for cleanup
expenses. 107 Thus, while [Mid/antic] precludes a trustee from abandoning
property without first bringing it into compliance with state environmental laws,
Mid/antic gives no guidance concerning the source of the cleanup funds. Third,
the limitations placed on abandonment power are uncertain; 108 the Court
stated that the limitation is too narrow to include instances in which contamination is merely speculative or where no "imminent and identifiable" harm
to the public is present. 109

Furthermore, the Midlantic exception does not apply to environmental
laws not reasonably calculated to protect the public health and safety. 110 The Court did not provide guidance regarding what circumstances constitute "imminent danger" or what laws "reasonably" protect the
public from that danger.

B.

Application of the Midlantic Decision

The Midlantic decision presents, trial courts with the difficult task of
formulating a test to determine whether a trustee's act of abandonment
is in contravention of state or federal law.. Some courts, interpreting the
Midlantic decision narrowly, find that a trustee may abandon contami-

103. Id. at 506-07.
104. Id. at 507 n.9.
105. Paula T. Perkins, Comment, Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic
Contamination: What's a Lender To Do?, 44 SW. L.J. 1563, 1575-76 (1991); Richard
A. Marshack, The Toxic Claim: Using Bankruptcy Law To Limit Environmental
Liabilities, 19 CAL. BANKR. J. 193, 199 (1991).
106. The Midlantic opinion was a 5-4 decision.
107. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498 n.2.
108. Id. at 507 n.9.
109. Perkins, supra note 105, at 1575-76 (quoting Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507
n.9).
110. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
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nated property if the trustee takes adequate rirecautions to ensure that
there is no imminent danger to the public. 1 1 These courts focus on
the act of abandonment and rely on the plain language of both the statute
and the opinion. Other courts, interpreting the Midlantic decision
broadly, find that a trustee is barred from abandoning any property if the
act of abandonment would violate a state or federal law designed to
protect the public health and safety. 112 These courts hold that the
trustee must comply with environmental law and the costs of compliance
are entitled to administrative priority. This interpretation of the
Mid/antic decision prevents abandonment of property which is not in full
compliance with state and federal environmental law. These courts focus
on the condition of the property and emphasize the greater importance
of environmental policies over bankruptcy objectives.
The Supreme Court's dicta in Ohio v. Kovacs, 113 which was decided
one year before Mid/antic, provides some guidance in understanding the
Court's Mid/antic decision. Kovacs involved a debtor who filed a
chapter 11 bankruptcy which was later converted to chapter 7. A
receiver had been put in charge of the debtor's property. The Court
provided dicta regarding the requirements for the debtor to abandon the
property had he been in control of the property instead of the receiver.
The Court stated:
If the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee would shortly
determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth more
than the cost of bringing it into compliance with state [environmental] law, the
trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the buyer would clean
up the property, in which event whatever obligation [the debtor] might have had
to clean up the property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth
less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon it to its prior
owner, who would have to comply with the state environmental law to the
extent of his or its ability. 114

111. E.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.),
856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In
re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
112. E.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1991); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re Microfab, Inc., 105
B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1987).
113. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
114. Id. at 284 n.12.
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From this passage it appears that a trustee may abandon property subject
to environmental liability in violation of state environmental law. The
Court indicated that the estate may avoid liability by abandoning the
property and that the party receiving the property must comply with
environmental law only to the extent of his or its ability.
1.

Interpretation o/Midlantic in Abandonment Cases

Some courts considering environmental liability in bankruptcy have
been presented with the issue of whether a trustee may abandon property
subject to environmental liability. 115 These courts interpret Mid/antic
narrowly. Most of them authorize abandonment. They distinguish the
facts in each particular case from Midlaritic s facts and hold that the
narrow exception carved out by the Supreme Court does not apply.
For example, in the case of In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 116 the
trustee sought court approval to abandon the property. State. laws
required that before a contaminated site may be abandoned the owner
must clean up the property, commit to monitor the site for up to thirty
years, and provide financial assurances. The trustee had no estate funds
available to comply. The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to
abandon the property even though abandonment would not be in strict
compliance with state environmental laws. The court, factually
distinguishing the case from Midlantic, found that there was no
imminent harm to the public, that abandonment would not aggravate the
existing situation, that the refinery was largely in compliance with state

115. E.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Farg9 Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.),
856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J.
1990); In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Better-Brite
Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989); In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988);
In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re Mowbray Eng'g
Co., 67
B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1986).
116. 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). After the debtor filed bankruptcy, the
chapter 11 trustee ceased all operations at the debtor's oil refinery site. Id. at 563.
During prepetition refinery operations hazardous substances had been dumped on the
property. Id. Although toxic substances were found on the site, none were found in the
public water supply. There was no imminent harm to the public health although it was
likely that at some indeterminable time, toxic substances would pollute the public water
supply. Id. at 563-64. The trustee took substantial steps to minimize hazards by drilling
monitoring wells, removing hazardous waste, draining tanks, maintaining fencing, and
commissioning an environmental report. Id. at 564. The cost of cleanup was estimated
at $2.5 million and the property would then be worth only $100,000. Id.
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agency directives, and that there were no estate funds available to
comply fully. 117
In the case of In re Franklin Signal Corp., 118 the bankruptcy court
held that a trustee may abandon contaminated property if the trustee
takes adequate precautionary measures to ensure that there is no
imminent danger to the public. " 9 Specifically, the court stated that at
a minimum the trustee must conduct an investigation to determine what
hazardous substances, if any, burden the property and the trustee must
inform state and federal agencies of the situation, including the trustee's
intent to abandon. 120
The court proposed five factors 121 to be considered in determining
whether a bankruptcy court may approve of abandonment of contaminated property. Applying this test, the court approved abandonment, even
though abandonment by the trustee would be in violation of state laws
designed to protect the public health and safety, because there was no
evidence of any imminent danger to the public, the amount of waste was
relatively small, and the estate did not have sufficient funds to dispose
of the waste. 122
In the case of In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 123 a chapter 11 corporate
debtor desired to abandon a fertilizer plant, which was the only piece of
property left in the estate. The bankruptcy court found that the property
was in violation of state law but that the violations did not present any
imminent harm or danger to the public. The court authorized unconditional abandonment because there were no unencumbered assets to fund

117. Id. at 565.
118. 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). Franklin Signal Corporation leased
property for manufacturing purposes. Fourteen drums, totalling 400 gallons, of
contaminated waste were generated and stored on the property before the debtor filed
bankruptcy under chapter 11. Id. at 269, 274 .. The case was converted to chapter 7 five
months later. The trustee filed a
motion to abandon the waste or, in the alternative, to determine how the cleanup would
be funded. Id.
119. Id. at 272.
120. Id. at 273.
121. The factors considered were: "( 1) the imminence of danger to the public health
and safety, (2) the extent of probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste,
(4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws, and (5) the
amount and type of funds available for cleanup." Id. at 272.
122. Id. at 273.
123. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856
F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the cleanup and the environmental violations posed no imminent harm
or danger to the public. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed unconditional abandonment based on the estate's lack of
unencumbered assets and the absence of imminent public harm. 124
While it was not an issue in this case because the estate had no
unencumbered funds, the court stated in dicta that "where the estate has
unencumbered assets, the bankruptcy court should require stricter
compliance with state environmental law before abandonment is
permitted." 125
In the case of In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 126 the district court
distinguished the facts before it from those in Midlantic and allowed
abandonment. 127 In Ferrante, no funds were available to correct
environmental hazards. 128 The debtor in Ferrante filed a chapter 7
liquidation, while in Midlantic the debtor filed a chapter 11 reorganization and converted to charter 7 only after the state sought compliance
with environmental laws. 29 In Ferrante, the public was adequately
protected, and abandonment of the system would not aggravate already
existing dangers. 130 The customers had been warned of the contamination and were able to refrain from using the water and the debtor's
operations had ceased long before the bankruptcy. 131 Further, the state
agency waited nearly eight years before seeking to enforce orders issued
against the debtor and pursued judicial remedies only after learning of
the trustee's intended abandonment. 132 The system did not pose an
imminent threat of harm to the fublic, and the state agency's interest
was in protecting the public :fisc. 33
In the case of In re Shore Co., 134 the district court affirmed the
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id. at 17.
126. 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990). The debtor owned a public water supply system.
The system was contaminated and a state agency issued a series of orders directing the
debtor to correct system deficiencies. Most were unremedied. Id. at 46. · In April of
1986 the debtor abandoned the system. Id. In April of 1987, the debtor filed a petition
to liquidate under chapter 7. The trustee sought authorization to abandon the system and
a state agency sought a court order compelling the trustee to operate the system in
compliance with state law. Id.
127. Id. at 50.
128. Id. at 49 n.8.
129. Id. at 48.
130. Id. at 50.
131. Id. at 49, 50.
132. Id. at 50.
133. Id.
134. 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991). The Shore Corporation operated an
oil refinery, discharging waste into the ground water and storing harmful materials in pits
on refinery property. Id. at 575. Shore filed a chapter 11 petition but six months later,
after an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize, the case was converted to chapter 7. Id. at
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bankruptcy court's decision and authorized abandonment, holding that
a trustee's right to abandon environmentally impacted property is limited
only by the precondition that the trustee remediate any imminent and
identifiable danger. 135 The court found that, unlike the Mid/antic case,
abandonment would not aggravate potential harm to the public because
the property had in fact been abandoned for almost a decade. 136 The
court explained that although "in all likelihood" the property was in
violation of environmental law, violation of environmental laws is not
enough to limit the trustee's power of abandonment, nor is the recognition that a site probably contains some hazardous substances sufficient. 137 The violation must constitute an imminent and identifiable
harm. 138 The court determined that there was no imminent and
identifiable harm. 139
In the case of In re FCX, Inc., 140 the court found that the presence
of five tons of buried pesticide in an uncontrolled condition on the
debtor's property constituted an imminent and identifiable harm to those
living in the area. 141 The court granted administrative expense status
to "only those costs reasonably required to remove the immediate
threat." 142 The court authorized abandonment "on the condition that

573. The trustee attempted to sell the refinery and commissioned a closure study to
determine the cost of cleanup for the purpose of making the property more attractive to
buyers. Id. at 573-74. However, funds to clean up were not allocated and efforts to sell
the property were unsuccessful. Id. at 574. After four years in chapter 7, a newlyappointed chapter 7 trustee decided to abandon the property. Id.
135. Id. at 578.
136. Id. at 579.
137. Id. at 578.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 96 B.R. 49 (Bania. E.D.N.C. 1989). FCX, Inc. operated a pesticide blending
plant from 1940 to 1969. Id. at 51. In 1969, FCX buried five tons of "off spec"
pesticides in a pit at an indeterminate location on the plant site. Id. In addition, FCX
buried 50 to 100 gallons of liquid DDT in glass bottles. Id. at 52. FCX also routinely
disposed of another chemical, Lindane, by pouring it directly on ground soil. Id. FCX
filed bankruptcy under chapter 11 in 1985 for the purpose of liquidating its assets and
distributing them to creditors. Id. at 50. In May 1986, FCX notified the EPA of its
recently discovered hazardous waste problem. Id. at 51. The estimated remediation
costs were greater than the value of the property in an uncontaminated condition. Id.
FCX attempted to abandon the property. Id.
141. Id. at 55.
142. Id.
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[the debtor] set aside the sum of $250,000 for the payment of clean up
costs incurred by [the] EPA or the State." 143
In each of these cases, the court, when presented with the issue of a
trustee's power to abandon property subject to environmental liability,
applied Mid/antic narrowly and determined that the trustee who takes
adequate precautions to protect the public health and safety may abandon
environmentally impacted property. The costs associated with taking
precautionary measures to protect the public against imminent harm are
incurred postpetition by the bankruptcy estate and therefore qualify for
treatment as administrative expenses.
The National Bankruptcy
Conference (NBC), has proposed rules for abandonment based on the
Bankruptcy Code and a narrow interpretation of the Mid/antic decision.144

2.

Consequences of Abandonment

When property is abandoned, control of the asset is. reinstated in the
debtor with all rights and obligations as before the filing of the
bankruptcy. 145 Title to property abandoned by the estate revests in the
debtor retroactively to the date of commencement of the case. . The
result is as if the estate -never owned the property. 146 However, the

143. Id.
144. Rules for Abandonment:
1. A trustee or debtor in possession should have the right to abandon property
"that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit
to the estate."
2. The abandonee of property under section 554 should have a prepetition
claim for damages, that is, for the net cost of remediation (full cost less
residual value of the property).
.
3. Property is subject to being abandoned only if as of the date of relief the
property was legally identifiable as separate from other property of the debtor
(and had not been previously set off by a transfer subject to any avoiding
power under the Code).
4. A trustee or debtor in possession who intends to abandon or sell property
subject to environmental regulation should be required to protect the public
from immediate danger by (1) promptly giving to a public authority or
authorities responsible for the regulation notice of the immediate danger and
(2) taking steps to forestall- immediate environmental harm until a public
authority or other responsible entity can assume control of the site.
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 88, at 24.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). Abandonment divests the property from the estate.
Legislative history suggests that the property is abandoned .to the person having a
possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878; Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 n.12 (1985).
146. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "[p]roperty abandoned under [section 554] ceases to be part of the estate[,]
... reverts to the debtor[,] and stands as ifno bankruptcy petition was filed"), aff'd, 502
U.S. 410 (1992); see also In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D.
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debtor's assets, if any, are in the bankruptcy estate. The debtor thus is
in no position to cure environmental violations or reimburse anyone for
cleanup expenses.
A rule of law prohibiting abandonment of environmentally burdened
property does not resolve the problem of environmental cleanup when
the responsible party has no resources . to fund or reimburse the
cleanup. 147 Although ownership of abandoned property is reinstated
in the debtor, with respect to continuing violations of state environmental
laws several parties have an interest in disposing of the waste or
cleaning up the site, including the debtor, the property owner (if the
debtor is not the owner), the secured creditors, the state and federal
governments, the corporate officers and directors, and other PRPs. 148
If the estate lacks the resources necessary to clean up the contaminated
property, there are likely third parties (who often oppose the abandonment) who are better situated than the bankruptcy estate to prevent
potential "imminent and identifiable" harm. In some circumstances
abandonment may be the only means of achieving the Supreme Court's
goal of protecting the public from "imminent and identifiable" harm. 149
For example, in one unusual case, In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 150
the bankruptcy court authorized the conveyance of a possessory interest
in the contaminated property to the EPA for environmental
remediation. 151
Often in cases of abandonment, the court focuses not on the issue of
public health and safety, but i_nstead on the public fisc, with an interest
in preventing the government from ]?earing the co.st of environmental
cleanups. The Ferrante court considered these issues and aptly noted:

Mich. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986);
LaRoche v. Tarpley (In re Tarpley), 4 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
147. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 272 n.5. A broad interpretation of Mid/antic
creates a troublesome dilemma in a chapter 7 no asset bankruptcy. There are no estate
funds available for the trustee to comply with environmen4tl law. Yet, a bankruptcy
court will prevent the trustee from abandoning the property without full compliance with
environmental law. Thus, the trustee is unable to administer burdensome property in the
estate. However, ultimately the property will be abandoned by default pursuant to
§ 554(c) which provides for abandonment of all property remaining in the estate when
the case is closed. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988). A rule preventing abandonment
accomplishes nothing under these circumstances.
148. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 274; Marshack, supra note 105, at 200.
149. Marshack, supra note 105, at 200.
150. 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
151. Id. at 219.
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"That the State may be forced to bear the expense of remedial measures,
when that expense should have been borne by [the debtor] before it :filed
for bankruptcy, is perhaps unfair but nonetheless [is] not a basis for
restriction of the powers given a trustee under the Bankruptcy
Code." 152 The courts should focus on the issue of public health and
safety as Mid/antic explains. In matters concerning the public :fisc, it is
Congress, and not the bankruptcy courts, that has the power to restrict
the actions of a bankruptcy trustee. This must be done by Congress'
careful revision of the Bankruptcy Code, not by judicial :fiat.
In the Mid/antic dissent Justice Rehnquist noted that
[w]hat the [majority] fails to appreciate is that respondents' interest in these
cases lies not just in protecting public health and safety but also in protecting
the public fisc . . . . But barring abandonment and forcing a cleanup would
effectively place respondents' interest in protecting the public fisc ahead of the
claims of other creditors. Congress simply did not intend that § 554 abandonment hearings would be used to establish the priority of particular claims in
bankruptcy. i'3'3

This led Justice Rehnquist to conclude that "[t]he bankruptcy court may
not, in the exercise of its equitable powers, enforce its view of sound
public policy at the expense of the interests the [Bankruptcy] Code is
designed to protect." 154 This reasoning leads to the conclusion that
public policy grounds should not be used· by a bankruptcy court to
justify establishing its own set of priorities to further an environmental
agenda when the Bankruptcy Code and nonbankruptcy law together
define the priorities to be followed in bankruptcy.
V.

TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS

Whether or ·not the trustee chooses to abandon burdensome estate
property, the bankruptcy estate remains liable for prepetition environmental claims incurred by the debtor. Furthermore, the estate may incur
additional environmental liability based. on postpetition ownership or
operation of the property. The Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish
environmental claims from other claims. An environmental claim, like
most other unsecured claims, should be treated as a general unsecured
claim unless it is entitled to priority treatment as an administrative
expense. To maximize the distribution of estate assets to creditors,
administrative expense claims must be kept to a minimum. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, to qualify as an administrative expense the expense
152. In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45, 50 (D.N.J. 1990).
153. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
516-17 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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must arise postpetition and must either rehabilitate or preserve the estate,
providing a benefit to the estate. 155
The requirement of an actual
benefit is necessary to protect the limited assets of the estate for the
benefit of unsecured creditors. 156 The expense must not be incurred
primarily in the interest of an individual claimant; it must, in· fact,
benefit the estate and the creditors as a whole. 157 In a liquidation case,
where there is no reorganization effort, benefit to the estate is particularly important because the emphasis of the bankruptcy is on maximizing
the size of the estate to be distributed to creditors rather than assuring
continuing business operations. 158
Although environmental cleanup may be a benefit to society, it may
not preserve or benefit the bankruptcy estate. When environmental

155. The Bankruptcy Code provides: "After notice and a hearing, there shall be
allowed administrative expenses . . . including , . . the actual, necessary costs and
expenses ofpreserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988)
(emphasis added).
Many courts have interpreted this language. E.g., In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584
(7th Cir. 1984) (denying administrative expense priority to an advertiser because the
claim was based on an irrevocable contract with the debtor which was executed
prepetition, even though benefits of the contract accrued to the estate postpetition);
Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir.
1976) (holding that to establish administrative expense status, the claimant must show
that the claim is based on a transaction with the debtor in possession and that the
transaction resulted in a direct benefit to the estate); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Rea Express, Inc. (In re Rea Express, Inc.), 442 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding,
in a chapter 11 case, that workmen's compensation payments to employees injured
prepetition were not entitled to priority as an administrative expense and that sums due
to employees postpetition were entitled to priority only to the extent that they were
attributable to events during the pendency of the proceedings); In re CIS Corp., 142 B.R.
640 (S.D,N.Y. 1992) (holding that a lessor of computer equipment to a chapter 11 debtor
was not entitled to administrative priority for postpetition rent because the debtor
subleased the equipment to a third party which had prepaid the entire amount owed
under the sublease to the debtor prepetition and as a result the sublease conferred no
postpetition benefit on the debtor's bankruptcy estate); In re Coastal Carriers Corp., 128
B.R. 400 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (stating that owners of a tug which towed the debtor's
barge three quarters of the way across the Atlantic Ocean before it sank were entitled
to an administrative expense for payment of a postpetition towage contract and finding
that the debtor's estate benefited because it was able to function as a going concern and
to enter into a commercial shipping contract which gave rise to certain rights and
liabilities).
156. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853
F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988).
157. Coastal Carriers, 128 B.R. at 403.
158. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 706.
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cleanup costs exceed the value of the property after cleanup, there is
clearly no economic benefit to the estate in incurring the cleanup cost.
Furthermore, treating environmental claims as administrative expenses
may substantially deplete estate resources and significantly reduce
unsecured creditors' compensation. The courts have arrived at conflicting treatments of environmental claims due to competing environmental
and bankruptcy policies and the failure of either bankruptcy law or
environmental law to authorize expressly priority treatment of environmental claims.
In one case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
the priority of a nuisance claim in In re Chicago, Rock Island & Paci.fie
Railroad Co. 159 In that case, the debtor was reorganizing but had
ceased operating its railroad and was liquidating that portion of its
business. The state sought a court order to compel the debtor to remove
the debtor's abandoned highway crossings from state property in an
effort to prevent prospective nuisances. The court held that the state
would not be entitled to administrative expense priority for costs
incurred in removing the crossings in the absence of any evidence that
the removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger. 160 The court
refused to grant administrative priority to the nuisance claims because
the benefits to creditors of avoiding potential future liability were too
slight and conjectural. 161
In sorting out the conflict between environmental law and bankruptcy
law, some courts have found Kovacs controlling and have refused to rely
on Mid/antic to determine the proper treatment of environmental claims
because Mid/antic addressed the issue of abandonment and declined to
consider the proper treatment of environmental claims. 162 In Kovacs,
the Supreme Court found that a state injunction directing the cleanup of
a hazardous waste site was a prepetition "claim" dischargeable against
the debtor. 163
For example, the Nirtth Circuit found Kovacs controlling in the case'.
of In re Dant & Russell, Inc. 164 and determined that the lessor's claim

159. 756 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1985).
160. Id. at 520, 523.
161. Id. at 520.
• 162. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
498 n.2 (1986).
163. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
164. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853
F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988). Dant & Russell, Inc. operated a wood treatment plant on
leased property. Id. at 701-02. The corporation filed chapter 11 and continued
operations for over a year to facilitate liquidation. Id. at 702. A stat.e agency discovered
massive toxic waste contamination at the site resulting primarily from prepetition
operations by the debtor and debtor's predecessor. Cleanup costs were estimated
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for environmental cleanup costs was a prepetition claim. 165 The court
properly refused to prioritize the prepetition environmental claim as an
administrative expense and instead treated it as a general unsecured
claim. The court explained:
Congress alone fixes priorities. Courts are not free to formulate their own rules
of super or sub-priorities within a specifically enumerated class. . . . [U]ntil the
[state] legislature enacts such protective provision or until Congress amends
sections 503 and 507 to give priority to claims for [environmental] cleanup
costs, [the court is] without authority to create such a priority. 166
.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Kovacs
controlling in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze
Co. 167 The Third Circuit held that a prepetition contractual indemnification claim was properly treated as a general unsecured claim not
entitled to administrative priority'. 168 The bankruptcy court had granted
Southern a lien against the proceeds of the sale of Johnson's manufacturing plant for the cost of cleanup. 169 The Third Circuit explained that,
in exercising its equitable powers, the bankruptcy court is not free to
create rights otherwise unavailable under applicable law. 170 State law
provided no means for placing a lien on the property based on a contract
indemnification claim and the bankruptcy court refused to create such· a
lien.
·
Both Dant & Russell anc.lSouthern Railway involved lessees whose
prepetition conduct resulted in prepetition claims against the bankruptcy

between $10 and $30 million. Id. The lessor sought administrative expense priority for
the cleanup costs at the
site. Id. at 703.
165. Id. at 709. The court decided that consequential damages arising out of the
breach of an unexpired lease should be regarded as prepetition. Id.
166. Id. at 709 (citation omitted).
167. 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985). Johnson Bronze Co. (Johnson) conducted
manufacturing operations and disposed of sewage on an adjacent site owned by Southern
Railway Co. (Southern) pursuant to a license agreement which provided that Johnson
would indemnify Southern for any liability arising from its use. Id. at 139. Johnson
disposed of hazardous waste on Southern's site. Id. A cleanup order was issued, but
Johnson ceased operations and filed chapter 11 prior to compliance. Id.
168. Id. at 141. The Third Circuit cited Kovacs which held that Ohio's injunction
directing the cleanup of hazardous waste was no more than an unsecured claim and
noted that Mid/antic was not controlling because that decision expressly declined to
reach the issue of what priority, if any, ought to be afforded a claim for the cost of
cleanup. Id.
169. Id. at 138.
170. Id. at 142.
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estate. In each case, the court properly refused to pnont1ze the
prepetition general unsecured claim as an administrative expense without
express authority from state or federal law.

A.

The Role ofMidlantic In Determining Administrative Priority

In sorting out the proper treatment of environmental claims in light of
the competing policies of environmental law and bankruptcy law, most
courts look to Mid/antic for guidance. Abandonment is considered
relevant based on the premise that if a trustee cannot abandon property
without satisfying certain conditions, he can neither maintain nor possess
that property without _satisfying the same conditions. 171 The cost
incurred in satisfying those conditions is entitled to priority as an
administrative expense of the estate. 172 Courts recognize that the real
issue in abandonment is not disposing of the property but determining
who is liable for environmental cleanup. 173 As a result, most courts
presented with the issue of abandonment interpret Mid/antic narrowly,
whereas most courts presented with the issue of reimbursement of
environmental cleanup costs rely on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic.
Interestingly, Mid/antic expressly declined to address the treatment of
environmental claims in bankruptcy. 174 Nevertheless, varying interpretations of Mid/antic :S, exception have resulted in conflicting case law
regarding when environmental claims are entitled to treatment as
administrative expenses. The conflict is based on the fact that courts do
not agree on the conditions under which Mid/antic authorizes abandonment. Courts. relying on a narrow interpretation of Midlantic have
denied payment of environmental claims as administrative expenses
absent imminent and identifiable harm. 175 Courts relying on a broad
interpretation of Mid/antic have granted administrative priority to
environmental claims resulting from noncompliance with laws intended
to protect the public health and safety. 176 Arguably, the narrow
interpretation of Mid/antic is the proper interpretation based on the
express language of the opinion. 177

171. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
172. Id.
173. In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 n.9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In
re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
174. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
498 n.2 (1986).
175. In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
176. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 270.
177. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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1.

The Narrow Interpretation o/Midlantic

Courts interpreting Midlantic narrowly find an exception to the general
rule that prepetition environmental claims should be treated as general
unsecured claims when environmental liability causes imminent and
identifiable harm to the public health and safety. For example, in the
case of In re Pierce Coal & Construction, Inc., 178 the court recognized
an implied exception 179 to the classification of prepetition environmental claims as general unsecured claims based on its interpretation of the
Midlantic decision. The exception is triggered w.hen "imminent and
identifiable harm" is present. 180 Midlantic provides the rationale for
the exception: where imminent and identifiable harm is present, the
priorities of the Bankruptcy Code become subservient to environmental
laws designed to protect the public safety. 181 Consequently, the Pierce
Coal court reasoned that if the exception applies, then "the necessary
costs of protecting the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm may be elevated to administrative [expense] priority."182 However, although the court recognized the exception, it found
that it did not apply in this case. 183
Pierce Coal involved both prepetition and postpetition claims. In
Pierce Coal, the bankruptcy court held that the cost of reclamation of
land damaged prepetition could not be accorded administrative expense
priority and should be treated as a general unsecured claim because
Midlantic '.s' narrow exception did not apply. 184 However, the court
also held that the cost of reclamation of land damaged during

178. 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). The debtor operated a surface
mining business for a year under chapter 11 before conversion of the case to chapter 7.
Id. at 522-23. The court considered the priority of the state's claim against the estate
for the cost of reclaiming property mined by the debtor both prepetition and postpetition.
Id. at 530-31.
179. Id. at 531. The court recognized an implied exception to the general rule that
prepetition environmental claims are general unsecured claims where imminent and
identifiable harm is present, but the court refused to apply the exception because no such
harm was present based on the evidence presented.
180. Id.
181. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
506-07 (1986).
182. Pierce Coal, 65 B.R. at 531.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 531.
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postpetition operations would be entitled to administrative priority
because the cost was necessary to preserve the estate. 185 The court
explained that a bankruptcy court has no authority to elevate a
prepetition unsecured claim to an administrative expense. 186 The court
noted that although "[c]ongressional intent to allow enforcement of
environmental regulations is clear," 187 congressional intent to preclude
governmental agencies from gaining favored priority as creditors while
acting under the umbrella of their governmental enforcement powers is
explicit. 188
The exception was also recognized in the case of In re Stevens. 189
In that case, the court decided that the costs incurred by a state agency
in protecting the public from imminent and identifiable danger due to
improper and illegal storage of hazardous waste were entitled to
treatment as administrative expenses. 190 The court explained that
under these circumstances, Midlantic altered the criteria for determining
the allowance· of administrative expenses set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code. 191 The Stevens court noted Midlantic s rationale for the exception, namely that "public health and safety take precedence over the
longstanding, but more parochial, concerns of efficient bankruptcy
administration." 192
The costs of taking precautions necessary to protect the public from
imminent harm should be treated as administrative expenses, whether or
not the trustee chooses to abandon the property and whether or not the
claim is prepetition or postpetition. Although the Midlantic decision did
not address the source of funding for precautionary measures, the costs
are actual and necessary to effectuate abandonment of the property for
the benefit of the estate and therefore qualify as an administrative
expense pursuant to section 503 .193 Theoretically, the trustee will only
abandon property and incur the l!dministrative expense if·the cost of
taking precautions is less than the cost of keeping the property.
However, if the trustee is precluded from abandoning property without

185. Id. at 530.
186. Id. at 531.
187. Id. at 530 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)). This section of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that an exception to the automatic stay exists to allow governmental agencies
to exercise police powers, including enforcement of environmental regulations. Id.
188. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5)). This section provides that enforcement of
a money judgment is an exception to the police power exception; enforcement of a
money judgment is an act which is subject to the automatic stay. Id.
189. 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
190. Id. at 783.
191. Id. at 780-81.
192. Id. at 781.
193. In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
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taking adequate precautions to protect the public from imminent harm,
there is a strong argument that the trustee should be required to take
those same precautions even if he chooses to keep the property.
Mid/antic '.s' policy of protecting the public health and safety from
imminent harm supports this proposition. Therefore, the precautions
necessary to protect the public from imminent harm must be taken
whether or not the trustee seeks to abandon, and the associated costs
should be treated as administrative expenses.
Several other courts, acting in concert with these principles, have
denied administrative priority to environmental claims absent a showing
of imminent and identifiable harm. For example, in the case of In re Jr.
Food Mart ofArkansas, Inc., the bankruptcy court denied administrative
expense priority for the costs of removing underground gas tanks
because the cost was neither necessary to preserve nor beneficial to the
bankruptcy estate. 194 There was no evidence that the tanks created an
environmental hazard or posed a threat to the public health and safety
or that cleanup was required. 195
The Shore court also denied administrative priority to environmental
claims absent a showing of imminent and identifiable harm. 196 The
Shore court allowed the trustee to abandon the contaminated property
and, finding no imminent harm, refused to authorize use of the
unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate for cleanup purposes to
satisfy· the prepetition environmental claim. 197 The court found the
depletion of estate assets a relevant though not an overriding concern to
be considered by the court. 198 Finally. the court decided that administrative expenditures to clean up the property would only deplete the
estate without yielding any contemporaneous benefit to, the estate. 199

194. 144 B.R. 423 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). The owners of property leased by the
debtor to operate a gasoline station requested payment for the cost of removing
underground storage tanks after the debtor vacated the premises. Id. at 424.
195. Id. at 425.
196. Shore, 134 B.R. at 578. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
197. Shore, 134 B.R. at 579-80.
198. Id. at 580 n.4; see also In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 170 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
Contra In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
199. Shore, 134 B.R. at 580.
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2.

The Broad Interpretation of Midlantic

Courts interpreting the Mid/antic decision broadly find an exception
to the trustee's power of abandonment when abandonment is in
contravention of any law designed to protect the public health and
safety. 200 Most courts interpreting Mid/antic broadly are presented not
with the issue of abandonment but with the issue of the priority of
environmental claims. These courts begin their analysis by referring to
the Supreme Court's Mid/antic decision--a case which addressed the
question of abandonment, not administrative priority. They find that the
condition for abandonment is full compliance with laws designed to
protect the public health and safety. Thus, if a trustee cannot abandon
property because of noncompliance with an environmental law, then the
cost incurred in complying with the environmental law is entitled to
priority as an administrative expense. 201 Courts interpreting the
Mid/antic decision broadly focus on the condition of the property, rather
than on the act of abandonment, and emphasize the greater importance
of environmental policies over bankruptcy policies.
For example, in the case of In re Peerless Plating Co.,202 the EPA
sought reimbursement of CERCLA response costs as administrative
expenses. Construing Mid/antic, the Peerless court found three
conditions under which a trustee may abandon a hazardous waste site in
contravention of environmental law. The court determined that a trustee
may not abandon a hazardous waste site unless:
1. the environmental law in question is so onerous as to interfere with the
bankruptcy adjudication itself; or
2. the environmental law in question is not reasonably designed to protect the
public health or safety from identified hazards [imminent and identifiable harm];
or
,
3. the violation caused by abandonment would merely be speculative or
indeterminate. 203

200. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 270. This position is based on the premise that a
violation of an environmental law which is intended to protect the public health and
safety creates a threat of imminent harm to the public health and safety.
201. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10
(2d Cir. 1991); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d
118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987); Micro/ab, 105 B.R. at 168; Peerless, 70 B.R. at 948-49.
202. 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). Peerless Plating Co., due to
regulatory and labor difficulties, ceased operations of its metal plating shop and filed
bankruptcy under chapter 7. Id. at 945. Two months later, the EPA was informed that
gas had been ·detected in the plant. The EPA determined an immediate cleanup was
necessary. Id. After the debtor and trustee declined to clean up, the EPA proceeded
to clean up the property. The EPA demanded reimbursement from the trustee. Id.
203. Id. at 947.
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After considering these conditions, the court concluded that the trustee
could not abandon the site in violation of CERCLA. 204 Furthermore,
the court decided that the EPA's cleanup costs were entitled to priority
as administrative expenses because the EPA's cleanup discharged the
bankruptcy estate's liability for the cleanup. 205
Although the court granted administrative priority based on a violation
of CERCLA, the facts of the case arguably fall within Mid/antics
narrow exception. The EPA, after learning that gas had been detected
in the Peerless plant, undertook an immediate cleanup to protect public
health and safety.206 The actual and necessary costs of the EPA's
precautionary measures to protect the public health and safety from
imminent and identifiable harm should be entitled to treatment as an
administrative expense. This falls within Mid/antics narrow exception.
In the case of In re Stevens, 207 a state agency sought administrative
expense priority for the reimbursement costs incurred in disposing of
drums containing hazardous waste. The court determined that a trustee
could not abandon the drums because abandonment posed a threat to
public safety and was in contravention of state laws reasonably designed
to protect the public. 208 The Stevens court found that abandonment
required full compliance with "relevant" state and local laws. 209 Since
the chapter 7 trustee could not abandon the hazardous waste without
fully complying with relevant state and local laws, the estate was liable
for the cleanup costs and the state agency was entitled to administrative

204. Id. at 947-48.
205. Id. at 948.
206. Id. at 945.
207. 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987). The debtors owned a scrap metal business. While
operating the business, the debtors acquired drums of oil containing dangerous levels of
PCBs (prepetition). Id. at 775. In 1981, the debtors were instructed by the EPA to
properly store the drums and dispose of them by January 1, 1984. Id. at 775-76. The
debtors stored the material in a locked trailer lined with plastic but their precautions
were not in compliance with EPA requirements. Id. at 776. The debtors
failed to dispose of the drums prior to filing a chapter 7 petition for liquidation on April
26, 1984. The debtors subsequently ceased operation of their business. Id. The state
agency directed the trustee or debtor to dispose of the drums. Id. Neither the debtor nor
the trustee undertook the cleanup. The state sought reimbursement for removal costs as
an administrative expense. Id.
208. Id. at 780. The court noted that abandonment to a debtor violates state law
and the express policy of controlling hazardous waste to assure no threat to public health
and safety. Id.
209. Id. at 782 n.7.
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expense priority.210 In this case, however, the debtor had taken
precautions prepetition to protect the public health and safety by storing
the drums in a locked trailer. 211 The trustee maintained the precautions
postpetition. 212 The property was not abandoned without the estate
adhering to conditions designed to protect the public's health and safety.
Therefore, the facts in this case do not appear to fall within Mid/antic '.s'
narrow exception and Mid/antic does not support the court's holding.213
In the case of In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 214 the state
sought reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs associated with
drums containing hazardous waste which belonged to the bankruptcy
estate and which were stored on the debtor's leased manufacturing site.
The court determined that the chapter 7 trustee could not have abandoned the property because the debtor violated state law intended to
protect the public health and safety prepetition and the violations
continued postpetition.215 The court found that because the trustee
could not abandon the property, the expenses incurred to comply with
state law were "actual and necessary, both to preserve the estate in
required compliance with state law and to protect the health and safety
of a potentially endangered public."216 Because the state discharged
the estate's cleanup obligation, the state was entitled to reimbursement
of cleanup costs as administrative expenses. 217
The rationale of the Wall Tube court is irreconcilable with the facts of
the case. In order to qualify for administrative expense priority under
Mid/antic, expenses must be incurred to protect the public from an
imminent and identifiable harm. 218 Although the court explained that
abandonment would have subjected the public to the "same threat the

210. Id. at 783.
211. Id. at 776.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stevens
court's recognition of an exception to the general rule that prepetition environmental
claims should be treated as general unsecured claims even when environmental liability
causes
imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety.
214. Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987). The debtor operated a metal product manufacturing business on leased
property, generating hazardous waste which was stored in drums on the site. Id. at 11920. The state undertook the cleanup and sought reimbursement as an administrative
expense. Id. at 121.
215. Id. at 122.
216. Id. at 124.
217. Id.
218. Midlantic Nat'! Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
507 n.9 (1986).
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court in Midlantic sought to avoid-a continuing, potentially disastrous
environmental health hazard,"219 the facts of the case do not support
the conclusion that there was an imminent and identifiable threat. In
fact, the drums of hazardous waste were not actually disposed of for
over two years after being discovered. 220
In the case of Chateaugay, the district court held that all environmental cleanup costs assessed postpetition with respect to sites currently
owned by debtor where there had been a prepetition release or threatened
release of hazardous wastes were entitled to administrative priority.221
The issue on appeal was whether this was an attempt to convert
prepetition contingent claims to priority status by simply liquidating
them. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
district court and held that "[i]f property on which toxic substances pose
a significant hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must the
[sic] follow . . . that expenses to remove the threat posed by such
substances are necessary to preserve the estate."222 The court appeared
to rely on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic to support granting
administrative priority to the prepetition environmental claims. In fact,
the determinative factors in the court's decision were the debtor's
continued operations postpetition under chapter 11 and the CERCLA
liability incurred by the estate postpetition, .not the presence of an
imminent and identifiable threat to the public.223 The Chateaugay
court explained that the "EPA is doing more than fixing the amount of
its [contingent] claim; it is acting, during administration of the [chapter

219. Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122.
220. Id. at 120 & n.5.
221. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10
(2d Cir. 1991). LTV, a diversified steel, aerospace, and energy corporation, filed chapter
11 and scheduled 24 pages of contingent environmental claims held by the EPA. Id. at
999. The EPA asserted $32 million in prepetition response costs at 14 identified sites.
There were potentially more sites at which LTV might have been a PRP and the $32
million may have been only a small fraction of the total response costs required to clean
up all of the sites. Id.
·
222. Id. at 1010.
223. · Id. at 999. The court explained that the debtor's obligation to assure that
facilities it operates postpetition comply with environmental laws is not dischargeable
and that CERCLA response costs incurred during the bankruptcy at sites owned or
operated by the debtor are entitled to administrative expense priority. Id. .
Courts have granted administrative expense status to
environmental claims based on liability incurred not by the debtor prepetition, but by the
bankruptcy estate postpetition as an owner of contaminated property.
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11] estate, to remedy the ongoing effects of a release of hazardous
substances. "224
In the case of In re Micro/ab, Inc., 225 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to compel a chapter 7 trustee to clean up the debtor's
industrial site. The court relied on Mid/antic, even though the trustee
did not seek to abandon the site, reasoning that "if the Trustee cannot
abandon property without satisfying certain conditions, neither can he
maintain or possess it without satisfying them."226 The court determined that abandonment requires full compliance with state environmental laws subJect to four conditions.227 Three of the conditions rarely
are in issue. 28 However, the fourth condition, lack of estate assets to
comply with environmental law, is common. According to condition
four, if the trustee does not have sufficient funds to comply with
environmental law, then the trustee does not have to comply with state
law in order to abandon property. In Micro/ab, the fourth condition was
in issue.229 Even after the court found "imminent and identifiable
harm" to the public, the court refused to order the trustee to clean up the
property because no significant improvement in ,the condition of the
property would result from exhaustion of the estate's funds. 230
Although Mid/antic requires a chapter 7 trustee to bring contaminated

224. Id. at 1010.
225. 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). The debtor's bankruptcy estate
contained real property which had been contaminated with hazardous substances before
the debtor filed a petition under chapter 7. Id. at 161-62. The trustee did not seek to
abandon the site. Id. at 163. Instead, a state agency wanted the trustee to remediate the
contamination at the estate's expense or to pay the state agency's cleanup costs as an
administrative expense. Id. at 162. The estate contained approximately $750,000 of
unencumbered cash. The state's estimate to clean up the site was two million dollars.
Id. at 164.
,
226. Id. at 168.
227. The four conditions are:
1. The laws must be reasonably calculated to protect the public health or
safety from imminent and identifiable harm.
2. The violation resulting from abandonment may not be speculative or
indeterminate.
3. The law must not be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy
adjudication itself.
4. The trustee cannot be ordered to clean up when he does not have financial
resources to do so.
Id. at 169.
228. First, environmental laws are typically intended to protect public health and
safety. Second, rarely are violations of an environmental law speculative or indeterminate. Third, the Supreme Court provided no standard for determining whether a law is
so "onerous" as to interfere with bankruptcy adjudication, so this is difficult to prove.
The EPA often has already taken action based on a thorough investigation.
229. Id. at 169.
230. Id.
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property into compliance with state environmental laws on an administrative expense basis, that requirement is subject to the limitation of
estate assets necessary to achieve appreciable results.
The Peerless, Stevens, Wall Tube, Chateaugay, and Micro/ab courts,
each presented with the issue of liability for environmental cleanup
costs, interpreted Mid/antic broadly, requiring full compliance with state
and federal laws intended to protect the public health and safety. 231
These courts found that the costs incurred in complying with state law
were entitled to treatment as administrative expenses. However, the
Mid/antic opinion expressly stated that the exception to the trustee's
power of abandonment was a narrow one requiring the existence of an
imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety. 232
These courts failed to recognize the express language of the Mid/antic
decision. Their decisions are inconsistent with the decisions of other
courts233 that have applied Mid/antic to abandonment cases and with
the Supreme Court's Kovacs decision, which acknowledged that a trustee
may abandon property in violation of environmental law but that a party
who subsequently receives and possesses the property must comply with
environmental laws. 234
Although Mid/antic may stand for the proposition that costs incurred
in taking precautionary measures to protect the public from imminent
harm are entitled to treatment as administrative expenses, nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code nor in state law provides that any environmental claim
arising from a violation of environmental law is to be accorded
administrative expense priority.235 The narrow exception carved out
in Mid/antic does not authorize administrative expense priority for costs
incurred in complying with environmental laws absent a showing of
imminent harm to the public, and then only to the extent necessary to
protect the public. Violations of state or federal environmental laws are
not to be treated lightly, but a violation is not conclusive evidence of the
existence of an imminent and identifiable harm. The particular

231. Although subject to exceptions in several cases.
232. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
507 n.9 (1986).
233. In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990); In re Shore Co.,
134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
234. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985).
235. In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
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circumstances surrounding a violation must be examined to determine
whether such harm is present. The Mid/antic exception does not justify
prioritizing reimbursement of CERCLA response costs absent a showing
of imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety.
The Peerless, Stevens, Wall Tube, and Chateaugay courts granted
administrative priority for costs incurred in complying with environmental law.
However, Mid/antic did not even address administrative
priority and, to the extent administrative priority was implied, it was
limited to the narrow exception carved out in the opinion. Nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code creates administrative expense priority for claims
to cure violations of any law designed to protect the public health and
safety. Under nonbankruptcy law, environmental liability is "prioritized"
ahead of unsecured creditors only by creating and perfecting a security
interest in real or personal property.236 Absent such an interest,
nothing in nonbankruptcy law establishes a priority that can be applied
in bankruptcy.
Although environmental policies are important, courts should not
ignore the priorities established by Congress under the Bankruptcy Code
and the priorities established by state legislatures under state law. As
Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Kovacs, state
and federal legislatures have the freedom to establish their own priorities
for environmental claims.237 Alternatively, Congress is free to change
the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code to specially prioritize
environmental claims. The courts should not compromise existing law
by relying on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic to prioritize environmental claims.
If one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be
clear from the statute. 238 Giving priority to a claimant not clearly
entitled · to priority is inconsistent with the policy of equality of
distribution and dilutes the value· of the priority for those creditors
Congress intended to prefer.

B.

The Role of Environmental Law in Determining Administrative
·
Priority
·

The treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is particularly
complex because the proper treatment depends on the type of bankruptcy

236. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
237. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc.
(In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 953 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Nathanson v.
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952)).
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(reorganization or liquidation), the type of claim (prepetition or
postpetition), and the law from which the claim is derived (e.g.,
CERCLA, RCRA, etc.). In determining administrative priority issues,
a distinction must be drawn between prepetition claims asserted against
the debtor and postpetition claims asserted against the bankruptcy estate.
The general rule is that prepetition environmental claims should be
treated as general unsecured claims. Mid/antic established a narrow
exception to the general rule when prepetition environmental liability
causes imminent and identifiable harm to· the public health and safety.
The costs incurred by the bankruptcy trustee in protecting the public
from such imminent and identifiable harm are entitled to priority as
administrative expenses.239 In addition, postpetition environmental
claims incurred during the bankruptcy may be entitled to priority as
administrative expenses. 240
When a debtor files bankruptcy, the assets of the debtor become
property of the bankruptcy "estate." If environmentally impacted
property owned by the debtor becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, the
question arises: To what extent does the estate incur liability as an owner
or operator of the property? If a trustee is allowed to abandon the
property, the abandonment is retroactive to the petition date; the result
is that the estate incurs no liability as an owner because the effect of
abandonment is the same as if the estate never owned the property.241
However, the estate does remain liable for prepetition environmental
claims incurred by the debtor.242
Some environmental statutes, like CERCLA, impose liability on the
current owner or operator of the property, regardless of fault. Since the
trustee cannot abandon environmentally burdened property because there
exists an imminent and identifiable harm to public health or safety, the
costs incurred in taking precautions to protect the public from that harm
are treated as an administrative expense.243 If the trustee takes the
necessary precautions and then abandons, the estate should be able to
avoid liability as an owner or operator.

239. See supra notes 178-92 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
242. Although the estate remains liable, the debtor may be discharged from
prepetition debts. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
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If the trustee chooses to keep the property or to continue to operate its
business on the property, the question arises whether the estate incurs
postpetition liability under CERCLA as an "owner or operator." In the
case of In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 244 the court considered this
issue. The EPA asserted a postpetition CERCLA claim against the
bankruptcy estate based on postpetition operations, not on the debtor's
prepetition operations.245
The court, apparently unclear about the effective date of abandonment,
offered two alternative outcomes. First, assuming the trustee was
permitted to abandon the drums, the court found that the estate would
nevertheless incur CERCLA liability as an operator of the site. 246 This
position was based on the premise that abandonment was not retroactive
to the petition date. According to this premise, abandonment would not
free the estate from liability incurred as an operator from the petition
date to the date of abandonment. However, most courts hold that the
effective date of abandonment is retroactive to the petition date. 247
As an alternative holding, the court decided that if abandonment is
retroactive to the petition date, thus relieving the estate of liability under
CERCLA, then the trustee would not be permitted to abandon the
property based on public policy considerations requiring compliance with
state and local laws regulating the abandonment of hazardous waste. 248
Thus, under this alternative, the court required (as a condition of
abandonment) that the trustee comply with CERCLA. In order to
abandon, the estate would have to satisfy the existing CERCLA liability
as an administrative expense.249 In either case, the court refused to
allow the estate to avoid CERCLA liability.250 The court found that
the costs incurred in satisfying the estate's CERCLA liability were

244. 45 B.R. 278 (Banlcr. N.D. Ohio 1985). This decision was prior to the
Mid/antic decision. The corporation operated a rubber recycling plant on property
leased from the corporation's owner. Id. at 280. The debtor in possession operated
under chapter 11 for eight months before the case was converted to chapter 7. Id. The
EPA discovered drums containing hazardous materials which had been buried on leased
property prepetition. Id. at 281. The EPA undertook a cleanup effort and sought
reimbursement of its CERCLA claim against the estate as an administrative expense
based on the estate's postpetition ownership and operation of the property. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 284.
247. E.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 1987). "Of
course, title to property abandoned by the estate revests, usually in the debtor,
retroactively to the date of commencement of the case. Therefore, if the estate could
abandon under Mid/antic, . .. the estate could avoid [CERCLA] liability [for owning the
site]." Id. at 948 (citation omitted). See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
248. T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. at 284.
249. Id. at 286.
250. Id.
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actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate and were entitled to
administrative priority. 251
Keeping in mind that under CERCLA a bankruptcy estate is liable for
owning or operating a hazardous waste site, one can conclude from the
foregoing discussion that if the trustee or debtor in possession can
abandon the property, the estate can avoid. postpetition CERCLA
liability. However, if the trustee or debtor in possession cannot abandon
the property, the estate, as the owner or operator of the property, is
subject to postpetition CERCLA liability. This is true notwithstanding
the fact that the EPA may have a valid prepetition claim against the
estate based on the debtor's prepetition ownership or operation.
Although a bankruptcy estate may incur postpetition CERCLA liability
based on ownership or operation of estate property, CERCLA does not
establish what priority such a claim should receive in bankruptcy. A
bankruptcy court faithfully applying the Bankruptcy Code will treat a
prepetition CERCLA claim as a "general unsecured claim."252 Similarly, the court will treat a postpetition CERCLA claim as a "general
unsecured claim" unless the court finds that the postpetition claim is
entitled to administrative priority because the requirements of section
503 are satisfied.253
As we have seen, inside of bankruptcy, some courts "prioritize"
environmental claims ahead of other unsecured creditors, even though
such prioritization would not be available outside of bankruptcy and
notwithstanding the fact that the requirements for such prioritization are
not met. An unsecured environmental claim should not be entitled to
priority ahead of other unsecured creditors merely because it arises out
of the violation of an environmental law. The court should prioritize an
environmental claim only if the statutory requirements set forth in
section 503(b)(1 )(A) are met. 254 One court has explained that prioritization of claims under section 503(b) "begins with the premise that all the
251. Id.
252. See supra part II.B.
253. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988). The section provides: "After notice and a
hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses . . . including . . . the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case ...." Id. See
supra part II.B.
254. Although CERCLA provides for the creation of a federal lien on property to
secure the payment of response costs, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988), a lien on property of
the estate perfected postpetition may be avoided, 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988).
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costs to be considered are postpetition and some of them will receive
administrative-expense priority."255 Nevertheless, bankrupcty courts
continue to grant administrative priority to the EPA for unsecured
environmental claims.
Some courts have taken one step further and granted environmental
claims priority ahead of secured creditors. One example is the case of
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc. 256 The bankruptcy court, interpreting
Mid/antic narrowly, held that because the trustee had no unencumbered
assets to :finance a cleanup and there was no imminent danger to the
public, the trustee could abandon the property even though violations of
environmental laws existed.257 However, the court also granted the
EPA a superpriority lien on the property to secure repayment of the
EPA's cleanup costs.258 Ironically, CERCLA provided a statutory
basis for establishing only a junior lien on the property.259 Thus,
outside of bankruptcy the EPA would not be able to attain this
superpriority lien. Nevertheless, the court found that the EPA was
entitled, as the trustee would be under section 506(c),260 to recover
cleanup costs, ahead of any secured creditors, because the cleanup
provided a benefit to the secured creditor.261 Without reimbursement
of the EPA's costs, the secured creditor would have received an unfair
windfall at the taxpayers' expense.262
The case of In re Mowbray Engineering Co. 263 presented the.
bankruptcy court with a similar situation. In that case the trustee could
not abandon the property without cleaning it up, but the estate had no
assets available for cleanup. 264 The court allowed abandonment but

255. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.),
963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992).
.
256. 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989). The chapter 7 trustee moved to
abandon the debtor's real property and leases. The EPA did not oppose abandonment
provided it received priority liens on the properties ahead of the secured lenders. Id. at
915. The EPA would then be first in line to collect the proceeds of the sale of the
property subsequent to decontamination.
257. Id. at 917.
258. Id. at 919.
259. "42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) imposes liability on the owner or operator of any facility
for 'all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government.' Section 9607(/) creates a federal lien
for such costs, but the lien is subject to prior valid liens." Id. at 917.
260. Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "The trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the
holder of such claim." II U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988).
261. Better-Brite, 105 B.R. at 917-18.
262. Id. at 918.
263. 67 B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986).
264. Id. at 35.
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prioritized the EPA's claim for cleanup costs ahead of the secured
creditors.265 The court explained that the "EPA stands in the shoes of
the trustee in preserving the estate and is entitled, as the trustee would
be but for abandonment, to recover costs upon sale of the property prior
to satisfying any secured claims against the property."266 It is important to note that outside of bankruptcy the EPA would not have been
able to attain this priority ahead of secured creditors.
C.

The Role of "Reorganization " in Determining Administrative
Priority

One purpose of administrative priority is to facilitate rehabilitation of
a debtor-business by encouraging third parties to provide goods and
services. Congress has recognized that if a business is to be reorganized,
third parties must be willing to provide the goods and services necessary
to continue the operation.267 Because third parties will be unwilling
to do so without assurance of payment, section 503 provides a priority
for expenses incurred by the trustee or debtor in possession in order to
continue business operations. Costs "ordinarily incident" to the
postpetition operation of a reorganizing business are entitled to
administrative priority because continued operation benefits the creditors
of the estate.268
It should be noted that Congress did intend that administrative
expenses include claims other than those that preserve the assets of the
bankruptcy estate. 269 The language of section 503 indicates that
administrative expenses include those that preserve the assets of the
bankruptcy estate but are not restricted to only those that preserve the
assets of the bankruptcy estate. For example, expenditures that deplete
the estate's assets but rehabilitate the debtor's business are entitled to
administrative priority.

265. Id. at 35-36.
266. Id. at 35.
267. Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950,
954 (1st Cir. 1976).
268. Creditors are entitled to be treated under a chapt(;)r 11 plan at least as well as
they would be treated under a chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
269. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.),
963 F.2d 1449, 1456 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Controversy has arisen regarding whether the bankruptcy estate must
actually benefit from an administrative expenditure. The question is how
broadly should the term "administrative expenses" be interpreted. Many
courts grant administrative priority only if the costs either help
rehabilitate the business or preserve the estates assets, thus providing a
benefit in some way to the estate. 270 These courts rely on the overriding concern in bankruptcy of "keeping fees and administrative expenses
at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as possible for the
creditors. "271
·
The Supreme Court has not construed the term "administrative
expens~s" narrowly. 272 Consequently, neither have many lower courts.
For example, one court found that "costs that form 'an integral and
essential element of the continuation of the business' are necessary
expenses even though priority is not necessary to the continuation of the
business. "273 In Reading Co. v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that
those injured by the negligence of a bankruptcy trustee operating the
debtor's business during reorganization were entitled to recover damages
as administrative expenses.274 The Court reasoned that "[e]xisting
creditors are, to be sure, in a dilemma not of their own making, but there
is no obvious reason why they should be allowed to attempt to escape
that dilemma at the risk of imposing it on others equally innocent."275
The Court was concerned with fairness and policies of compensating
innocent tort victims for injury suffered and encouraging trustees to
adequately insure the businesses they operate.276 These policies form
the basis for the longstanding general rule of imposing a receiver's tort
liability on the receivership.

270. E.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.),
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc. 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr.
N.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that the cost of reclamation of land damaged during
postpetition operations was entitled to administrative priority because the cost was
necessary to preserve the estate and that the estate benefited by postpetition mining
operations); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(cited in N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1454); In re Vennont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R.
804, 806 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (finding
that the expenses incurred in removing a dangerous building which had collapsed
postpetition on the debtor's leased premises were entitled to treatment as an administrative expense because removal was necessary for preservation of the leasehold as part of
the chapter 11 bankruptcy estate and was necessary for the public's safety).
271. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1454 (quoting Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53
(1947)).
.
272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 484 (1968)).
274. 391 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1968).
275. Id. at 482-83.
276. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456.
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Based on the principles of "fairness" expressed in Reading, some
courts have granted administrative priority to the actual, necessary costs
of preserving the estate even though there was no actual benefit to the
estate. Courts focusing on fairness to innocent persons injured by the
estate's actions may be inclined to expand the meaning of administrative
expense to claims that do not aid the rehabilitation of the business or
preserve a maximum of assets for distribution. But if the "fairness to
innocent victims" argument is determinative in deciding administrative
expense status, any postpetition act which violates the law and damages
another should be treated as an administrative expense entitled to priority
ahead of prepetition creditors. Such a broad interpretation of administrative priority would discourage creditors from supporting a chapter 11
reorganization and force distressed businesses into liquidation. 277
Creditors of a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate would be unwilling to
become insurers arainst liability which would not be insurable by
traditional means. 27

D.

The Role of 28 US.C. § 959 in Determining Administrative
Priority

When the trustee continues to own or operate the property, does the
trustee or debtor in possession have a duty to operate the property in
compliance with state laws? Are costs of compliance entitled to
administrative expense priority? Must prepetition claims be satisfied
and violations be corrected postpetition as administrative expenses?
Should the trustee's liability for noncompliance postpetition be entitled
to administrative expense priority when the same liability for noncompliance incurred by the debtor prepetition is only treated as a general
unsecured claim?
These questions cannot be answered without first considering the
duties of the bankruptcy trustee. It is well recognized that an owner or
operator of property outside of bankruptcy must abide by state law.
Similarly, Congress has mandated that a trustee managing and operating
estate property must abide by state law. 279 Thus, section 959(b)
277. Reading, 391 U.S. at 487 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 489.
279. Section 959 provides:
[A] trustee ... appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property
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requires that liability incurred postpetition by a trustee or debtor in
possession be paid from the assets of the estate. However, controversy
arises regarding the priority of such liability incurred by the trustee on
behalf of the estate. The resolution of this controversy depends on
whether the bankruptcy is a reorganization or liquidation.
1.

Reorganization

When a trustee or debtor in possession operates the debtor's business
postpetition, section 959 applies. 28° Compliance with state law is
required and the associated costs should be treated as administrative
expenses necessary to preserve the estate. When a business is in
reorganization, it is attempting to start anew as a viable, going concern.
During the reorganization the business must abide by the same laws and
regulations as its competitors. Otherwise, the bankruptcy estate would
have an unfair advantage over nonbankrupt competitors. Businesses
under the protection of chapter 11 should not be allowed to cut costs and
to benefit by ignoring safety, environmental, or any other laws. 281 To
assure that the estate will receive no advantage over other competitors,
penalties and fines imposed on the bankruptcy estate resulting from
violations of nonbankruptcy law by the trustee should be given
administrative priority. The estate creditors would obtain the benefits
associated with the debtor's business operating as a going concern but
would incur the liability associated with trustee's violation of state or
federal nonbankruptcy law.
The Supreme Court addressed. this issue in Reading. In that case, the
Court decided that tort liability incurred by the receiver during
postpetition operation of the debtor's business was a cost of doing
business entitled to administrative priority.282 The Court justified its
holding based in part upon the fact 'that the injury was one which might
have been insured against. The Court sought to encourage receivers to
insure adequately the businesses they operate. Insuring against tort
liability is a common practice and the costs would clearly qualify for
administrative priority because they are necessary to preserve the assets
in his possession as such trustee, according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State in
·
which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or
possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
280. Id.
281. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.),
963 F.2d 1449, 1456 (11th Cir. 1992).
282. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968). See supra notes 274-78 and
accompanying text.
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of the estate. In the Reading case, however, the damage was so great
that insurance coverage likely would have been inadequate to compensate for the loss. 283 Nevertheless, the risk and resulting liability was
a consequence of the trustee's continued operation of the debtor's
business. The estate obtained the benefit of the ongoing business subject
to the risks and liability associated with continued operations that any
other similar business might incur.
In the case of In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit extended the Reading decision by granting
administrative priority to a compensatory civil fine imposed against the
debtor in possession for a postpetition violation of an injunction to abate
a nuisance. 284 The court found that a postpetition "intentional act
which violates the law and damages others" should be treated as an
administrative expense.285
Another example of the treatment of this issue is presented in the case
of In re Laurinburg Oil Co. 286 In that case, the debtor maintained and
operated a waste disposal facility postpetition. The state sought
injunctive relief to abate postpetition violations of water pollution laws
which were creating a threatened release of hazardous waste. The
bankruptcy court, relying only on section 959, found that the reasonable
and necessary expenses incurred to abate violations of the state water
pollution laws were administrative expenses necessary to preserve the
estate. 287
Based on section 959 and these decisions, it is reasonable to conclude
that penalties for violations of state and federal law are entitled to
administrative expense priority as necessary costs of the continuing
operation of the chapter 11 debtor's business. Arguably such penalties
are not entitled to administrative priority because they provide no benefit
to the bankruptcy estate, even though they are properly considered part
of the cost of the debtor's continued business operations. But neither
logic nor legal precedent support this position. First, the estate will
benefit if allowed to operate postpetition without making the expenditures necessary to comply with state environmental laws. Second, the
283.
284.
F.2d 200
285.
286.
287.

Reading, 391 U.S. at 483.
Spunt v. Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. (In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc.), 755
(1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 203.
49 B.R. 652 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984).
Id. at 654.
.
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Supreme Court has found postpetition penalties incurred by a trustee
while operating the debtor's business postpetition were entitled to
administrative priority under the Bankruptcy Act. 288
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, convinced that
the bankruptcy estate was liable for all penalties arising out of the
trustee's postpetition operation of the debtor's business, regardless of
their type, granted the postpetition penalties priority as administrative
expenses. 289 The court reasoned that although prepetition penalties
should not reduce the distribution to the creditors because the creditors
could not have prevented accrual of penalties, postpetition penalties
could be granted priority as administrative expenses because during
bankruptcy business operations are subject to court supervision and the
creditors, having a voice in its operation, can prevent violations of the
law and the accrual of penalties.290 Creditors benefiting from the
postpetition operation of the debtor's business cannot object to the
liabilities which arise under nonbankruptcy law as a result of the
ongoing business.
In another case, In re N.P. Mining Co., the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit granted administrative priority status to a punitive civil
penalty for environmental violations resulting from the operation of the
debtor's business postpetition. 291 The priority status served the federal
policy of requiring trustees to operate bankruptcy estates in compliance
with state law. 292 The court granted priority even though the penalties
were not used to repair environmental damage,293 there was no evidence of an imminent health hazard, 294 and the estate was no longer
in a position to abate violations and avoid :fines.295 The court, citing

288. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57
(1939); see also In re Samuel Chapman, Inc., 394 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that
creditors should not benefit from the debtor in possession's postpetition tax delinquencies
and holding that the estate remains liable). In Boteler, the Supreme Court explained:
"Subdivision 57(j) prohibits allowance of a tax penalty against the bankrupt estate only
if incurred by the bankrupt before bankruptcy by reason of his own delinquency. After
bankruptcy, it does not purport to exempt the trustee from the operation of state laws,
or to relieve the estate from liability for the trustee's delinquencies." Boteler, 308 U.S.
at 59-60.
289. United States Dep't oflnterior v. Elliott (In re Elkins Energy Corp.), 761 F.2d
168, 171 (4th Cir. 1985) (granting administrative-expense status to postpetition penalties
assessed against the debtor mining company for postpetition misconduct).
290. Id.
291. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.),
963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992).
292. Id. at 1458.
293. Id. at 1452.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1450.
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Elliott, explained that creditors, who receive the benefit of the ongoing
business and have influence over the debtor's business operations
postpetition, must prevent violations of the law or bear financial
responsibility for the consequences.296 To the court, the "punitive civil
penalties assessed as a consequence of the operation of a bankruptcy
estate's business [were] 'actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate' under section 503(b)(l)(A)."297
So far, these decisions have involved penalties incurred as a result of
postpetition operation of the debtor's business, and the courts have held
that such penalties are entitled to administrative priority. However, a
different issue regarding the proper classification and treatment of
environmental penalties arose in the case of In re Bill :S Coal Co. 298
In that case, the debtor attempted reorganization under chapter 11 but
ceased all mining operations on the date of filing bankrufitcy.299 A
year later the case was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. 00 During
the chapter 11 case, the state brought forty-two enforcement actions
against the debtor for noncompensatory penalties resulting from
violations of surface mining laws. 301 The court had to classify these
claims as prepetition or postpetition. The court found the claims were
postpetition30 even though all mining operations had ceased
prepetition. Having found the claims were postpetition, the court had no
difficulty granting them priority as administrative expenses, despite the
lack of benefit to the estate, because the payment of a fine for the
violation of environmental regulations should be considered a cost
ordinarily incident to the operation of _the business. 303 The court saw

296. Id. at 1460.
297. Id. at 1459.
298. 124 B.R. 827 (D. Kan. 1991).
299. Id. at 828.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 828-29.
302. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision reasoning that the
fact that the "debtor ceased strip mining when it filed for bankruptcy does not force the
conclusion that the violations were pre-petition, since obligations to reclaim land or
maintain certain land practices could continue regardless of whether [the] debtor was
actively strip mining." Id. at 829. The bankruptcy court had previously (and seemingly
correctly) found that the violations were prepetition claims based on the fact that the
debtor ceased all mining operations prepetition. Id. at 828.
303. Id. at 830 (relying on Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods.
Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 123-34 (6th Cir. 1987); Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit
(In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); Burlington N. R.R. v.
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no reason to distinguish between compensatory and noncompensatory
penalties304 and held that the penalties for the debtor's postpetition
misconduct were to be treated as an administrative expense305 despite
the lack of benefit to the estate. 306
The Bill :S- Coal decision is difficult to reconcile with other cases for
several reasons. First, the penalties were a result of the debtor's
prepetition conduct. Although the debtor was reorganizing in an attempt
to continue as a viable business enterprise, the mining operations had
ceased. The debt was not related to the ongoing business of the debtor.
Second, the creditors had no control over the estate's liability for the
penalties assessed postpetition. Because the claims were a result of the
debtor's prepetition mining, neither the creditors nor the court had any
control over the debtor to prevent the estate from incurring the liability.
Third, the debt was not a consequence of the debtor's postpetition
operations. The estate did not benefit from any postpetition mining
operations and therefore the penalties should not have been treated as an
administrative expense.
2.

Liquidation

Although it is well recognized that section 959 applies to trustees in
a bankruptcy reorganization, some controversy has arisen regarding the
applicability of section 959 in a bankruptcy liquidation. A broad
interpretation of section 959 leads to the conclusion that section 959
applies both to liquidating and to reorganizing trustees. Several courts
have taken this view. For example, the Stevens court reasoned that
"[s]ince the [liquidating] trustee cannot abandon hazardous waste and 28
U.S.C. § 959(b) requires that the trustee comply with valid state laws
affecting such property, ... the cleanup . . . remains the responsibility
of the estate."307 The Wall Tube'court also found that section 959(b)
requires a chapter 7 trustee to comply with state environmental law. 308
That court found no consequential difference between the duties of a
liquidating or reorganizing trustee with respect to compliance with
section 959 because "[i]n either case, an environmental hazard ... is

Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988)).
304. Id. at 830.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (D. Me. 1987).
308. Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118,
122 (6th Cir. 1987).
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within the control of the trustee."309 Although the Supreme Court has
not answered the question directly, the Court stated in Kovacs:
[A]nyone in possession of the site - whether it is [the debtor] ... or the
bankruptcy trustee - mm,t comply with the environmental laws of the State of
Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the
waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. 310

On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of section 959 leads to the
conclusion that section 959 only applies to reorganizing debtors. Several
courts have also taken this view. For example, the NP. Mining court
found that section 959 only applies when the property is managed or
operated for the purpose of continuing operations. 311 Similarly, the
Microfab court found that section 959 "does not require a Chapter 7
trustee to clean contaminated real estate" when the trustee neither
managed nor operated the property.312 The Stevens court found that
the fairer literal reading of section 959 was that it did not apply to a
liquidating trustee. 313 The narrow interpretation is preferable because
it takes into consideration that a liquidating trustee does not have the
same interests as an owner, operator, or even a reorganizing trustee. The
liquidating trustee will not pursue the long-term benefits and address the
long-term concerns that are the focus of attention for an owner, operator,
or reorganizing trustee. Assuming the narrow interpretation, section 959
cannot be used to create a postpetition claim against a bankruptcy estate
arising out of prepetition conduct or environmental violations. Because
there is no postpetition claim under these circumstances, the claim
cannot be prioritized and the question. of priority is not an issue.
However, even if one were to adopt the broad interpretation, and
decide that section 959 is applicable to liquidating trustees, there is
nothing in the section or elsewhere that establishes the priority of a
claim against the estate based on section 959. As the Reading court
noted, section 959 establishes only the principle of liability under state
law and does not define from whom or with what priority the claim

309.
310.
311.
963 F.2d
312.
313.

Id.
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985).
Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.),
1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992).
In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (D. Me. 1987).-
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ought to be collected. 314 In order for such a claim to qualify for
administrative priority, the claim must satisfy the requirements of section
503 of the Bankruptcy Code. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a section 959
claim will not satisfy the requirements of section 503 because such a
claim is not a necessary expense to preserve the assets of the estate for
the benefit of the creditors.
The case of In re Bio-Med Laboratories provides an example
illustrating the problems with the broad interpretation of section 959. In
that case, the lessor sought reimbursement for the fair rental value of
property occupied by the chapter 7 trustee for five months postpetition
while the debtor undertook environmental cleanup. 315 The bankruptcy
court determined that the trustee could not abandon the property in
contravention of state environmental protection law3 16 and, as a result,
the debtor was a holdover tenant obligated to pay rent. 317 In deciding
to grant administrative priority for the lessor's claim, the court,
apparently agreeing with the Wall Tube court, found it irrelevant whether
the trustee was liquidating, managing, or reorganizing. 318 The court
found the lessor was entitled to rent as an administrative expense
because allowing the debtor to remain on the premises as a holdover
tenant to clean up the property "effectively preserved the estate."319
Although the court found that the holdover tenancy benefited the estate,
it appears that the estate benefited only to the extent that the estate
discharged a CERCLA claim. However, only if the claim was the result
of postpetition operations under chapter 11, should the claim have been
treated as an administrative expense. If the claim arose prepetition, the
postpetition expense provided no benefit to the estate and should not
have received priority because the occupancy of the property during the
cleanup did not serve to preserve the chapter 7 estate for the benefit of
the creditors.
The case of In re Kent Holl~nd Die Casting & Plating, Inc. 320

314. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477-78 n.7 (1968).
315. In re Bio-Med Lab., 131 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991). The debtor
conducted business on leased premises. Id. at 73. The debtor operated under chapter
11 for a year before conversion of the case to chapter 7. Id. After conversion, the
trustee discovered hazardous waste on the property and the EPA required disposal in
compliance with environmental laws. Id. at 74. The chapter 7 trustee occupied the
property for five months for the purpose of carrying out the hazardous waste disposal.
Id.
316. Id. at 75.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Windolph Trust v. Leitch (In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc.),
125 B.R. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991). The chapter 11 debtor assumed a lease
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illustrates the proper treatment of postpetition environmental claims
asserted against a chapter 7 and chapter 11 bankruptcy estate. The
environmental liability which arose during the chapter 11 case resulting
from the debtor's breach of a lease agreement was accorded administrative priority. The liability which arose under the lease was incurred so
that the debtor could receive the benefits of the lease during the ongoing
operations of the debtor's business postpetition. The environmental
liability which arose during the chapter 7 case, resulting from the
debtor's breach of the lease agreement, was also entitled to administrative priority but was limited to the actual value conferred on the estate
as a result of the breach. Rental value was the very most to which the
lessor would be entitled as an administrative expense. The National
Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) has proposed a similar, though slightly
different, rule for granting administrative expense status to environmental
claims. 321
VI.

CONCLUSION

Determining the proper treatment of environmental claims in
bankruptcy requires recognizing established priorities in three areas of
law-the priority of bankruptcy law relative to environmental law, the
priority of environmental claims relative to other claims outside of
bankruptcy law, and the priority of environmental claims relative to
other claims within bankruptcy law. These priorities have been
considered in the analysis of when an environmental claim arises, the

postpetition which included an indemnification agreement for environmental liability.
Id. at 496. Two and a half years later, the debtor's case was converted to chapter 7.
Id. at 495.
321. The rules governing administrative expense priority:
1. Costs expended postpetition to clean up prepetition contamination of
property owned but not operated by the debtor postpetition should be entitled
to administrative expense priority only to the extent that the costs ( 1) actually
enhance the value of the property or (2) are necessary to carry out the trustee's
or debtor in possession's duty to protect the public from immediate danger
from environmental harm prior to abandonment or sale. The amount of any
other cleanup costs should be treated as a general
unsecured claim.
2. Costs expended to clean up contamination of property operated postpetition
or to prevent postpetition pollution should be entitled to administrative expense
priority.
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 88, at 30.
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extent and consequences of a trustee's abandonment power, and
environmental claim priority in order to define and evaluate criteria for
characterizing environmental claims and for determining their proper
priority in bankruptcy.
An environmental claim against a debtor should arise when the
debtor's conduct results in liability under environmental law, irrespective
of when environmental harm actually occurs, is manifested, is fully
known or knowable, or is remediated. The environmental liability may
be contingent, unmatured, or unliquidated. For example, a contingent
CERCLA claim will arise when there is a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance.
The bankruptcy estate should be liable for prepetition environmental
claims incurred by the debtor. Since the Bankruptcy Code does not
distinguish environmental claims from other claims, environmental
claims should be treated just as any other claims. A prepetition
environmental claim, like any other prepetition claim, should be
discharged unless it falls within an exception to discharge provided in
the Bankruptcy Code.
An environmental claim, like most unsecured claims, should be
treated as a general unsecured claim unless it is entitled to priority
treatment as an administrative expense. Administrative priority should
be granted for postpetition costs incurred in satisfying a prepetition
environmental claim only if the expenditure is necessary to protect the
public from immediate danger from the environmental harm. Any other
expenditures made to satisfy a prepetition environmental claim should
be treated as a general unsecured claim.
The bankruptcy estate may incur postpetition liability under environmental law because of postpetition ownership or operation of property.
In addition, the estate may incur postpetition liability based on the
trustee's duty to abide by state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 959.
Nevertheless, postpetition environmental claims should not automatically
be entitled to administrative expense priority simply because of their
"environmental" nature. In a reorganization case, only those expenditures made to satisfy postpetition environmental claims resulting from
the continued operations of the debtor's business during reorganization
should be treated as an administrative expense. In a liquidation case,
expenditures made to satisfy postpetition environmental claims should
be treated as an administrative expense only to the extent they provide
an actual benefit to the bankruptcy estate.
DEBORAH
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